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INTRODUCTION

International law provides an ideal context for studying the effects
of freedom from coercion on cooperative behavior. To be sure, almost
all academic discussions on the subject begin by asking whether
international law constitutes "law."
But the category of all
"international law" is too big and heterogeneous to permit useful
analysis. Whether to regard, say, the rules governing the conduct of
war or international humanitarian law as "law"' presents radically
different issues than analyzing the legal character of the Treaty of Rome
(the constitutive instrument of the European Community), 2 or the
Warsaw Convention (the instrument governing contracts for the carriage
of goods in international air transit).3 Instead, we will focus on a subset
of international law, namely enforcement mechanisms for treaties and
other agreements among states and, in particular, agreements that
involve the joint production of social welfare.4
By limiting our inquiry to welfare-enhancing international
agreements, we necessarily exclude customary international law. 5 The
1.
See James D. Morrow, The Institutional Features of the Prisonersof War
Treaties, 55 INT'L ORG. 971, 973 (2001) (observing that "POW treaties are one aspect
of the laws of war . . . [that] operate as institutions by shaping the decisions of actors
during wartime"); James D. Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and
Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S41, S45 (2002) (arguing
that "[tihe laws of war can be thought of as a prewar agreement by the sides to abstain
from using certain strategies during the war"); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to
Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1624, 1628-33 (1984) (observing that
humanitarian intervention-another broad exception under the UN Charter provisionrestricts the use of force).
2.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
O.J. C325/1 (2003).
3.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11,
reprinted in S. TREATY Doc No. 106-45 (2000).
4.
We focus our attention on welfare-enhancing international agreements in
order to examine systematically the enforcement questions that are at the heart of our
inquiry. See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
5.
The existence and significance of this body of norms and obligations is a
hardy perennial among specialists. See generally MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER,
AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
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lack of any clear consensus as to what customary international law
means or does, along with the spotty practice of courts regarding its
invocation, discourages us from attempting to explore its functional
effects. 6 Moreover, to the extent customary international law has any
coherence, it seems to comprise an amalgam of tort and property rules,
and we intend to explore the contributions that contract theory
specifically can make to our understanding of the field. Accordingly,
we will consider only the enforcement of express instruments entered
into by states.7

LAW (1999); ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1993);

see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 820
(1997) (tracing the origins of and challenging the modern position that customary
international law has the status of federal common law); Jonathan 1. Charney, Universal
InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 536-42 (1993); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric
A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 1113, 1114
(1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Theory] (using "game theoretical concepts to
explain how [customary international law] arises, why nations 'comply' with [customary
international law] as commonly understood, and how [customary international law]
changes"); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33
UCLA L. REV. 665, 669 (1986) (advancing the proposition that "[clustomary
international law consists of obligations inferred from the general 'practice of
states'

. .

. [that are] legally binding regardless of whether a state has expressly accepted

it").
6.
Another reason for preferring agreements to custom is that agreements
reduce the counterfactual problem that arises when departures from custom occur,
namely determining whether the departure constitutes a defection or adherence to a new
custom. See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games,
and the Role of Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1284-86 (2003). On the role of the treatyformation process in addressing the counterfactual problem, see John K. Setear, Law in
the Service of Politics: Moving Neo-Liberal Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theory by
Using the InternationalTreaty Process to Define "Iteration," 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 641,
646-47 (1997) [hereinafter Setear, Politics]. For an extension of the point to
noncoercive third-party dispute resolution based on international agreements, see Tom
Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudication in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of
InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1241-43 (2004).
7.

We acknowledge that the distinction between an international agreement

that looks to the joint production of social welfare and other types of international law
might not always be clear, inasmuch as the scope of some agreements may be more tacit
than formal, and most instances of customary law are said to rest on consent. For the
vast majority of cases, however, the distinction seems sufficiently clear to provide a
useful basis for analysis. We focus on explicit state commitments, in contrast to
obligations inferred from behavioral regularities or expressions of conventional wisdom.
We mean to include in our analysis agreements to which at least two states are parties,
including agreements to which nonstate actors, such as private firms or international
organizations, also join. We do mean to exclude multilateral agreements that have a
purely coordination, as opposed to a productive function. We also will not consider
contracts between a single state and private actors, although some aspects of our analysis
may be applicable to such agreements. For a general discussion, see generally Daniel
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We distinguish among international agreements according to the
enforcement mechanisms attached to them. This approach allows us to
concentrate on the instrumental aspects of agreements, as distinguished
from their moral or symbolic functions. We defend this focus by
arguing that the existence of observable instrumental effects has distinct
expressive value even to those who find interesting only the moral or
rhetorical aspects of law.8
Our thesis is straightforward: framers of international agreements,
no less than the authors of private contracts, can choose between self
enforcement and coercive third-party mechanisms to induce compliance
with the commitments they make. Studies of individual contracting
provide evidence that coercive sanctions may crowd out self
enforcement, implying that too great a propensity by external actors to
intervene in the contractual relationship may produce welfare losses.
We explore the possibility that too much coercive third-party
enforcement similarly can reduce the value of international agreements.
A casual acquaintance with the field may leave the impression that
international agreements can only be self-enforcing. No international
sheriff works in the background to compel compliance and punish
breaches of treaties. 9 Agreements may fashion their own enforcement
mechanisms, but these have no greater authority than the instrument that
R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, GovernmentalLiabilityfor Breach of Contract, 1 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 313 (1999).

8.
Our focus on enforcement strategies distinguishes this Article from other
research on the question of whether the parties to an international agreement seek to
create a binding obligation under international law. See Kenneth W. Abbot et al., The
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401-08 (2000) (noting the elements of
"legalization" to create common ground for lawyers and political scientists); Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, InternationalAgreements: A Rational Choice Approach,
44 VA. J.INT'L L. 113, 127 (2003) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, International
Agreements]; ANDREW T. GUZMAN, THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 3-4
(2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=487662 [hereinafter GUZMAN,
INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS];
KAL
AGREEMENTS

RAUSTIALA,

FORM

AND

SUBSTANCE

IN

1-6
(2004),
available
at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=505842. Some agreements that do not create an obligation
under international law nonetheless invoke self-enforcement mechanisms, while finding
that an agreement creates an obligation under international law does little to determine
what enforcement mechanisms apply. While some scholars contend that choosing to
make an agreement "legal" signals information about the parties' intent, we maintain
that the choice of enforcement mechanism reveals valuable information about the parties
and their perception of the future. See Goldsmith & Posner, InternationalAgreements,
supra, at 132-34; GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra, at 31-32.
9.
For example, H.L.A. Hart has stated:
It is indeed arguable, as we shall show, that international law not only lacks
the secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislature
and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying "sources" of
law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961).
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creates them. Consider a nonaggression treaty, such as that signed by
Stalin's Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany in 1939. l° Nominally, the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact called for arbitration of all disputes between
the parties, but the only sanction for violation was retaliation, a power
that existed regardless of the pact's provisions." Without international
law-enforcement institutions, it would seem that all international
agreements must stand or fall on the uncoerced good behavior of the
parties.
A somewhat more sophisticated approach would find an analogy
between international agreements and the many kinds of communally
enforced contracts. Medieval trade fairs, contemporary cotton, diamond
and rubber dealers, and lenders in U.S. immigrant communities, for
example, have employed social sanctions based on communal solidarity
as a substitute for third-party enforcement of commitments.' 2 Similarly,
some international lawyers argue that the international community
induces compliance with agreements by maintaining a running
assessment of the law-abiding quality of nation-states and using social
signals to deter violations of international commitments. 3

10.
Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Aug. 23, 1939, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., translated in 7 DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1918-1945, Ser. D, at 245 (1956) [hereinafter Treaty of
Non-Agression]; Secret Additional Protocol, Aug. 23, 1939, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R.,
translatedin 7 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1918-1945, supra, at 246-47
[hereinafter Secret Additional Protocol].
For a more general discussion of Nazi
Germany's use of the forms of international law, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A.
Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice
Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115, S116-17 (2002).
11.
Article V of the Treaty of Non-Agression contemplated, "if necessary," the
establishment of arbitration to resolve disputes between the parties, but the Soviet Union
chose other means to respond to Germany's flouting of the agreement by its invasion in
force on June 22, 1941. See Treaty of Non-Aggression, supra note 10, at 246; see also
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, June 22, 1944,
translatedin 11 DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1918-1945, Ser. D, at 107576 (1962) (indicating that Russian troops were stationed along the German Frontier).
12.
For studies of these phenomena, see JANET T. LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY,
AND IDENTITY:

BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL

ECONOMICS OF

ETHNIC TRADING

NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT EXCHANGE 112 (2001); Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1787-88 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Immanent Business Norms]; Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 841, 846 (1999); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval
Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 858 (1989); Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 133 (1996).
13.
For a synthesis of the argument that compliance with international
obligations depends critically on the perceptions of other nations about compliance, see
Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1847-51 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, Compliance-Based Theoryl.
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A deeper examination reveals, however, that international
agreements come with an array of enforcement mechanisms based on
various institutional arrangements. To be sure, most parties choose to
rely only on self-enforcement mechanisms, buttressed by social
sanctions imposed by the international community. But countries also
can turn to external mechanisms backed by credible coercive authority
to resolve their disputes. Agreements may invoke these mechanisms
explicitly, or third-party enforcement bodies may decide on their own to
enforce an agreement. International agreements, much like private
contracts, necessitate choices about enforcement structure, particularly
the mix between external enforcement and self enforcement.
The architects of international law long have remarked on the
apparent similarity between international agreements and private
But functional analyses of these formally similar
contracts.' 4
A
instruments traditionally has come from different directions.
substantial literature explores self enforcement of international
agreements, for the most part assuming that no other means exist for
inducing compliance.' 5 On the other hand, legal scholars of private
contracts until recently have focused mostly on the coercive aspects of
enforcement, and have slighted both the role of self enforcement in
explaining contract compliance and the interplay between self
enforcement and coercion." It would seem that, however compelling
the contract metaphor is in explaining bargaining behavior and
expectations, these two categories of agreements occupy different
universes in terms of their functions and behavioral effects.
But in the past few years, scholars have begun to explore how
coercive enforcement of private contracts affects self enforcement.7
14.
See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("A treaty
is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a legislative act.").
See, e.g., Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Multilateral Tariff
15.
Cooperation During the Formation of Free Trade Areas, 38 INT'L ECON. REV. 291,
291-92 (1997); Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L
ORG. 1, 1-5 (1986); Giovanni Maggi, The Role of Multilateral Institutions in
International Trade Cooperation, 89 AM. EcON. REV. 190, 191 (1999); John K. Setear,
Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The
Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State
Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1997) [hereinafter Setear, Responses]; Paola
Conconi & Carlo Perroni, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and Domestic
Political Credibility 1-2 (CESifo Working Paper No. 988, 2003).
See generally Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term
16.
Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987) [hereinafter Scott, Long-Term Contracts]
(criticizing this literature).
17.
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543-48 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott,
Contract Theory]; Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1652-61 (2003) [hereinafter Scott, Indefinite Agreements];
Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1041 (2002)
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Although these inquiries are too early and tentative to support firm
conclusions, a growing body of evidence indicates that, as to
individuals, the relationship between self enforcement and coercion is
The individual
complex and, in at least some areas, rivalrous.
characteristics that facilitate valuable self enforcement may be
suppressed once one introduces coercive sanctions.
It is not too great a leap to ask whether the insights into individual
decision-making and incentives suggested by these studies of private
contracts might also inform our understanding of state-to-state behavior.
We argue that, in spite of the obvious differences between state and
individual decision-making, enough commonality exist to make the
inquiry worthwhile. Using analytic moves worked out in the context of
private contracts, we make two general claims about international
agreements, one conventional and one controversial. First, efforts to
frame and implement international agreements can be evaluated usefully
in terms of optimal enforcement structure. Choosing from a broad
range of normative criteria, one still can distinguish between better and
Second, the optimal enforcement
worse enforcement strategies.
structure for any particular international agreement will depend on both
the goals of the agreement and the context in which it was designed and
implemented. Because these goals and contexts are diverse, the set of
Some optimal
optimal enforcement structures is heterogeneous.
on
self
enforcement,
while
structures
will
depend
largely
enforcement
Put simply, there exist cases where coercive
others will not.
enforcement of international law reduces welfare.
Central to our claim is an appreciation of the interaction of self
enforcement and third-party coercion, including binding arbitration, use
of international courts, and enforcement by domestic actors. In a far
from trivial number of instances subject to international agreement, self
enforcement and coercive enforcement may be rivalrous and the optimal
enforcement structure would preclude or limit coercive enforcement. In
particular, good theoretical arguments buttress the general tendency of
domestic courts to decline to enforce international agreements absent a
clear signal from the framers of the agreement. 18
[hereinafter Scott, Article 21 (advancing the argument that contracting parties prefer to

be governed under separate regimes of bright-line legal rules and flexible relational
norms that are not legally enforceable).
18.
We recognize that there are prominent exceptions to the tendency of
domestic courts not to extend their enforcement powers and that a significant scholarly
debate exists over the role of domestic courts in enforcing international law. Some
international law scholars argue, absent a legislative signal, that judicial noninvolvement
is required as a matter of constitutional structure and policy. See Curtis A. Bradley,
International Delegations, The Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1586, 1590-91 (2003); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The
Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MicH. L. REv. 757, 772-

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we develop an
informal model that draws on contract theory to specify the key
structural determinants of the formation and enforcement of international
agreements. The model introduces the theoretical underpinnings of selfenforcing agreements and proposes a framework for optimal
enforcement design under idealized conditions based on rational
reciprocity. Part II extends this model by applying it to international
agreements under more realistic conditions. It describes the array of
external and self-enforcement mechanisms available to states affected by
an international agreement and applies the rational-reciprocity
framework to the different enforcement strategies chosen by states. Part
III examines the relationship between self-enforcing and coercive
methods of inducing agreement compliance. We examine the conditions
under which self enforcement and coercion may be rivals rather than
complements and explore the implications of rivalry for the design of
optimal enforcement structures.
We draw a weak and a strong conclusion. We tentatively conclude
that rational preferences for reciprocity expand the domain of selfenforcing international agreements and provide a plausible explanation
for the reluctance of states to adopt available mechanisms for coercive
enforcement. By narrowing the domain of coercive enforcement, states
can preserve space for parties to exploit opportunities to reciprocate.
Our strong conclusion is that the rational-reciprocity approach offers
rich prospects for further research that will enhance our understanding
of international law.
I.

A

RATIONAL-RECIPROCITY APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS

We first ask the threshold question of why states choose to enter
agreements with other states that constrain their future behavior rather
than to rely on the present exchange of entitlements or other valuable
property rights. We conclude that it is the contractual character of these
agreements that constitute their appeal. As with private contracts, an
international agreement has an intertemporal aspect: parties agree today
to do something tomorrow.
But why do states enter into such
commitments? After all, international relations often are conducted
73 (2001). The same issue manifests itself in the form of statutory interpretation, in
particular whether jurisdictional statutes should be seen as authorizing judicial creation
of enforcement mechanisms for certain treaties. The U.S. Supreme Court noted this
issue but resolved little of it in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). We
profess agnosticism as to the constitutional and statutory debates. Our argument, rather,
is that a default of judicial nonenforcement has desirable welfare effects. We leave it to
others to explore whether constitutional or statutory interpretation should incorporate

welfare consequences.
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without them. States, just as private parties, often make simultaneous
exchanges of entitlements for corresponding concessions, rather than
exchange promises for the later trade of these entitlements. Recall the
exchanges of spies that periodically took place at Checkpoint Charley
during the Cold War. As long as simultaneity applies, a respect for
each state's entitlements is sufficient to encourage commerce between
the states because a state will only part with an entitlement if it values
more highly what is offered in exchange. Contract enforcement would
be unnecessary to support welfare-enhancing trades, of any sort,
between nations.
But in contrast to simultaneous exchanges, a contract is a set of
promises regarding future behavior. Such promises are costly to make
and to memorialize. To understand the role of enforcement in relation
to contracting behavior, one must explain why enforcement will induce
states to incur these costs.
A.

Why Write InternationalAgreements?

To answer the question of why states choose to enter enforceable
agreements that constrain their future actions, we begin with several
Assume a world of nation-states, each
simplifying assumptions.
governed by a class of rational elites that seek to maximize the welfare
of their citizenry. '9 Further assume that states have assets that they can
trade and invest, including property inherent to sovereign states such as
regulatory jurisdiction, military power, and revenue-collection
capabilities.' Finally, assume that some trades of this property may
enhance welfare-put simply, assume that complete autarky of all
nations is not the most desirable end-state.
As with private contracting parties, our hypothetical nation-states
face the canonical contracting problem of ensuring efficient ex post trade
and efficient ex ante investment.2 We can assume that each state will
"State welfare" is obviously a mushy term, but we use it here as
19.
synonymous with shared conceptions of the national interest. The key element of this
move is that we assume the absence of agency costs. Later, we will relax this
assumption. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
20.
We use the term "revenue-collection capability" to encompass not just the
traditional subject of tax treaties, but also the imposition of duties, quotas, and analogous
For exploration of the analogy of sovereign
constraints on international trade.
regulatory jurisdiction to a private-property right, see Joel P. Trachtman, Economic
Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-12 (2001); and Joel P.
Trachtman, Trade in FinancialServices under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A Regulatory
JurisdictionAnalysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 47-49 (1995).
21.
Implicit in our analysis is a set of assumptions more often associated with
what international-relations specialists would call rationalist institutionalism. To some

extent, these assumptions puts us at odds with those (self-described) realists that see state
insecurity, the drive for relative rather than absolute advantage, and exercises of
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ensure efficient trade without the need for enforceable agreements. For
example, if State A agreed to trade ten units of an economic good to
State B, but it turns out that trading twenty units would maximize joint
gains, then the parties can modify the agreement to provide for delivery
of the larger quantity. But ensuring efficient investment is more
difficult.
The investments we have in mind would include the
production of specialized goods or services, the development of human
capital specific to a particular relationship, and research to acquire
information about future economic or political conditions. Imagine, for
example, an arms-control treaty that requires a state to pass up the
design and implementation of a particular weapons system, or a trade
regime that makes the development of a particular product-for
example, a type of aircraft-valuable as long as other states will allow
their firms to purchase the good when produced. What defines these
investments is their relation-specific character, in the sense that they
have little or no value if put to an alternative use.
We propose a simple example to show how enforcement is essential
to ensuring these value-enhancing investments.22 Each state in our story
can either produce generic economic goods that are useful to many other
states or produce specialized goods that are specific to a particular
relationship with another state. Assume that State A can produce a
generic version of a particular economic good and sell it on the world
market at a price that equals cost (including a return on the selling
state's investment). Imagine, for example, that this good consists of a
particular exercise of sovereign power, such as a decision to regulate
through competition rules all transactions anywhere in the world that
have an observable economic effect on the state's economy. In addition,
imagine that other states purchase this product by adopting their own
rule of regulatory jurisdiction in light of State A's choice and that the
coercive power as the central mechanisms in international relations. See, e.g., John J.
Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY 5, 710 (1995). Similarly, because we believe that there exist objective factors-such as the
possibility of gains derived from cooperation, and information asymmetries-that explain
important aspects of international relations, we slight the insights of those who would
emphasize the role of ideological predispositions and culture in conditioning international
relations. See, e.g., ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
302-11 (1999). Finally, because we emphasize joint production that presents collective
actions problems, we neglect other forms of international cooperation and uses of
international law, in particular coordination problems that do not contain opportunism
problems.
See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma:
Implicationsfor International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 923,
931-36 (1985). We will not seek to defend our choices here, other than to note that
some work in international relations theory seems more congenial to mainstream
contract theory than does others.
22.
The example that follows draws on the work of Alan Schwartz and Robert
Scott. Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 17, at 559-62.
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costs and benefits of this product derive from the effects of all states'
regulation on global welfare.23 State A can also produce a specialized
version of the good for State B. Imagine, for example, that the
specialized good consists of allowing State B's regulatory decisions to
displace State A's for a specified range of transactions, such as the
application of competition rules to producers operating in State B-. 4
Assume that the cost of the generic good is $1000 and purchasing states
value it at $1500. The cost of the investment to produce the specialized
good is $2000 and State B values it at $3000. But State A's investment
to make the specialized good cannot be redeployed; thus, State A will
lose its entire investment if the agreement breaks down. For example,
imagine that State A would commit to follow State B's competition rules
and that State B then exercised its regulatory authority to encourage the
formation of monopolies designed to exploit consumers in State A.
Then State A might not quickly enact new legislation reclaiming its
regulatory power because of its constitutional arrangements governing
lawmaking.
Under these assumptions, State A and State B would prefer to
produce the specialized good when that would maximize the contractual
surplus. Using our hypothetical values, therefore, the parties would
The territorial scope of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction is unclear. A decade
23.
ago, the Supreme Court seemed to hold that the effects test, which asks whether foreign
conduct had a substantial and foreseeable effect on domestic economic activity, alone
determines whether the antitrust laws apply. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993). More recently, however, the Court has suggested that it will
also limit these laws to prevent unreasonable interference with the sovereignty of other
nations. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2367-68
(2004). For purposes of analysis, we assume that the regulation in question increases
aggregate welfare and, thus, does not involve significant economic rents. For debate
about these assumptions and extension of the regulation as property analysis, see
Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 895, 898
(2002); Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and InternationalRegulatory Competition,
90 GEo. L.J. 971, 971-73, 983-84 (2002); Erin Ann O'Hara, Economics, Public
Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90 GEo. L.J. 941, 942-43 (2002); Paul B.
Stephan, The PoliticalEconomy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 957, 957-61 (2002). If
these assumptions seem unrealistic, then one could conceive a different example, say a
more conventional economic good such as advanced weapons systems produced by a
public-private collaboration.
24.
Cf. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 662, 665 (explaining obligations under Treaty of Rome
for one state to defer to regulatory decisions of other states). For further analysis of
regulatory deference in the European Community, see generally Francesca Bignami, The
Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations after Enlargement, in LAW AND
GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE

(George A. Bermann & Katharina Pistor eds.,

2004). For discussion of specific proposals to allocate internationally the authority to
exercise competition policy jurisdiction, see generally Paul B. Stephan, Competitive
Competition Law? An Essay Against International Cooperation, in ANTITRUST POLICY:
CoMPEIrrrION AND COOPERATION

(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004).

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
agree to produce the specialized good: this agreement would generate a
surplus of $1000 while the alternative would generate only a surplus of
$500. Assuming that the two states are equally patient bargainers, under
certain plausible assumptions about bargaining behavior, they would
divide the $1000 surplus equally with a contract price of $2500.25
Assume initially that this agreement is not enforceable. In this
world, the price at which the parties ultimately will transact would not
be $2500, because State B's incentive to cooperate disappears after State
A invests $2000 in the deal. After State A has made its investment,
State B has an incentive to demand renegotiation of the price. It could,
for example, insist that State A make trade or regulatory concessions,
such as agreeing to purchase a weapons system produced in State B, as
compensation for State B's discouragement of monopolies targeted at
consumers in State A. At that point, State A would have sunk the
investment cost, which the renegotiated bargain therefore would ignore.
The only question for State A at this point is whether to trade the
specialized good at some price or not to trade at all. Because trade
would produce a gross gain of $3000 while the decision not to trade
produces no value, the parties would proceed with the renegotiated
transaction, dividing the $3000 gain equally. Under a renegotiated price
of $1500, of course, State A would lose $500 ($1500 less its investment
cost of $2000). Because State A would lose its entire investment if the
parties failed to trade, it would, albeit reluctantly, agree to the new
price. 6
The point of this example, of course, is that if the agreement were
unenforceable, State A would refuse at the outset to produce the
specialized good even though the relation-specific investment would
maximize expected surplus. State A would anticipate the hold-up
potential inherent in the investment situation and accordingly would elect
to produce generic goods instead. This outcome reduces the joint
welfare of the parties because the generic alternative generates a social
surplus of $500 while the specialized investment would have generated a
25.
We suppose that States A and B are equally patient, because they have
similar costs of capital. Thus, assuming the parties engage in "deal me out" bargaining,
the parties would share the surplus equally unless one party's next best option exceeds
half of an equal split. For discussion of the possible bargaining game and why an even
split is plausible, see Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 17, at 560.
26.
Id. at 560-61. We assume that the parties ignore State A's sunk $2000
investment cost when renegotiating the contract. There is experimental evidence that
individuals will sometimes take sunk costs into account. COLIN CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL
GAME THEORY 85-90 (2003).
Thus, an investing party's payoff in a bargain will
increase if the other party knows that the investor has spent money to prepare. See
Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, Caring About Sunk Costs: A Behavioral
Solution to Holdup Problems with Small Stakes, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 106, 106-07
(2003). As we discuss below, it is an open question whether the fairness concerns
regarding sunk costs that individual experimental subjects act upon also motivate states.
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surplus of $1000. But if State B's promise to pay the $2500 contract
price were enforceable, the parties could cooperate in producing the
State A would then anticipate being
value-enhancing investment.
compensated for its investment, and State B would always prefer the
specialized investment with its $500 payoff rather than the general
alternative that only generates a payoff of $250.27
What conclusions can we draw from this example? First, the
conventional view is that contract enforcement protects injured
promisees, such as State A, who otherwise will lose their reliance
interest in the prospective deal. But this view misses the main point. If
international agreements were not enforceable, then State A would not
risk its reliance in the first place. Instead, as in our example, it would
elect to produce generic economic goods rather than subject itself to
exploitation. The key insight is that enforcement benefits promisors; it
enables them to make credible promises to perform. State B, in our
example, wishes that it could make an enforceable promise to pay State
A the $2500 contract price. In sum, enforcement enables states to make
credible promises to each other to secure relation-specific investments
that will enhance the contractual surplus.28
Second, this example illustrates a primary motivation for states to
write enforceable international agreements. Enforcement is essential to
ensuring welfare-enhancing investments that are specific to bilateral or
multistate relationships. Our story suggests why, relative to the levels
seen in many developing countries, private parties have made so little
foreign direct investment ("FDI") in most of the former Soviet states.29
Most FDI is relation-specific-for example, building a factory far from
the home country or developing a mine or an oil field. Potential
investors will not deal unless the host country or local firm can make
credible promises to adhere to the terms originally agreed upon rather
than renegotiating those terms after investments had been made.30
Although many of the former Soviet states have signed international
agreements promising to protect foreign investment, investors have
reason to regard these promises as insufficiently credible. 31
Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 17, at 560-61.
27.
Id. at 562.
28.
See generally George T. Abed & Hamid R. Davoodi, Corruption,
29.
Structural Reform, and Economic Performance in the Transition Economies (IMF
at
available
2000),
132,
No.
Paper
Working
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wpOOl 32.pdf.
Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 17, at 562.
30.
See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text. The post-Soviet experience
31.
suggests that the existence of some coercion simpliciter is not as significant as the degree
of coercive third-party enforcement. The degree of coercive enforcement that these
agreements establish seems to have been insufficient to meet the concerns of foreign
investors. See discussion infra note 51.
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B.

Enforcement and Optimal ContractDesign

If enforcement enhances welfare, then how should countries pursue
it? What are the enforcement choices available to states seeking to
encourage relation-specific investments? A range of possibilities exist.
The options run from self-enforcement mechanisms to various forms of
third-party coercion, including a commitment to arbitration, the
embedding of enforcement in valuable multilateral organizations, and
direct enforcement in the promisor's domestic courts. For present
purposes, however, we need to distinguish only between self-enforcing
agreements and third-party coercive enforcement.
1.

SELF ENFORCEMENT

Self-enforcing agreements provide credibility to commitments
where parties contemplating noncompliance face effective sanctions that
do not depend on the actions of third-party enforcers. 2 Retaliatory
threats and reputation undergird the traditional analysis of this process.
Consider first a long-term relationship between a supplier and a
producer in which both firms make investments in the contract and face
significant costs in switching to different partners.
Both parties
appreciate their own and their counterparty's vulnerability to
opportunism.
Both have a credible capacity to retaliate against
opportunism based on their capacity to withhold the expected benefits
from future dealings.
A significant constraint on the efficacy of retaliatory threats,
however, is the extent of the parties' expectation of future benefits. As
the term of an agreement draws to a close, the parties have fewer future
benefits that retaliation can deny them. This end-game problem plagues
all relationships that have definite concluding points. End games aside,
exogenous changes that lead one or more parties to devalue what it
would gain from the agreement also diminish the effectiveness of
retaliatory threats.
As an alternative to contractor-specific relations, agreements may
invoke community-based sanctions based on reputational losses. This
mechanism involves transactors who belong to a community that invests
32.
There is extensive literature on self-enforcing contracts. See generally
Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Scott, Long-Term Contracts, supra note 16;
L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980); Oliver E.

Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177 (1985). For antecedent
work with different methodological commitments that provides rich insights into self
enforcement, see generally Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985

Wis. L. REV. 465, 465; Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
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in the monitoring of transactor behavior, disseminates information
generated by monitoring to community members at a reasonable cost,
and whose members retaliate against noncompliers. Reputation is an
effective means of self enforcement whenever a transactor values its
reputation in this community, such as where migration to other
communities entails significant costs, and community members make the
effort to impose sanctions on parties who break their agreements. 33
Like repeat play, there are constraints on the use of reputation as a
self-enforcement mechanism. Reputation cannot operate effectively
when the parties are strangers to each other, when a party intends to
withdraw from the community (as distinct from ending the contractspecific relationship), or when the benefits from opportunism exceed
reputational costsY" Thus, the range of contexts in which reputation can
enhance promisor credibility, although significant, is limited.
Contract theorists recently have augmented their study of self
enforcement by considering the tendency of people to value reciprocal
fairness. 35 New experimental work suggests that, in certain contexts,
reciprocity is a potent additional means of self enforcement.36 These
studies have produced three key findings. First, many people deviate
from purely self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner. Reciprocity
33.
Reputation is most effective as a means of enforcement in homogeneous
communities, where the behavior of individual parties is a matter of general knowledge.
See Avner Grief, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 287, 287-88 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group:
An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 349-50 (1981).
Professor Lisa Bernstein has documented as well the ability of trade associations to
disseminate information about individual misbehavior and to enforce boycotts and other
collective sanctions. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
MicH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). The contracting behavior of the members of the association
thus becomes part of the collective memory of the trade group. See Bernstein,
Immanent Business Norms, supra note 12, at 1787-88 (1996).
34.
See Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 13, at 1869-70, 1883
(discussing reputational effects and compliance with international law).
35.
For a fuller discussion, see Scott, Indefinite Agreements, supra note 17, at
1663-65.
36.
See, e.g., Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a ContractEnforcement Device:
ExperimentalEvidence, 65 EONOMETRICA 833, 833-36 (1997) [hereinafter Fehr et al.,
Reciprocity]; Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and
Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817, 852-54 (1999); David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism
and Spitefldness in Experiments, I REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 593, 594-96 (1998); Matthew
Rabin, IncorporatingFairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
1281, 1283 (1993). For further review of this literature, see generally Ernst Fehr &
Klaus Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity-Evidence and Economic
Applications (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper
No. 75, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?.abstractid=255223
[hereinafter Fehr & Schmidt, Fairnessand Reciprocity].
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means that in response to friendly actions, many people are much more
cooperative than predicted by the axioms of rational choice.
"[C]onversely, in response to hostile actions [many people] are
frequently much more nasty and [vengeful]." 37 Second, "[p]eople repay
gifts and take revenge even in [one-shot] interactions with complete
strangers and even if [such action] is costly for them and yields neither
present nor future material rewards." 38 Finally, this is a heterogeneous
world where some people exhibit reciprocal fairness and others are
selfish. Taking all the experiments together, from countries as diverse
as Austria, Indonesia, Russia, and the United States, the fraction of fair
subjects ranges from forty to sixty percent as does the fraction of
subjects who are selfish.39

This evidence suggests that third-party coercive enforcement may
be unnecessary to enhance the credibility of promises even in
circumstances where retaliatory threats and reputation effects might not
work. As long as the fraction of reciprocally fair individuals in the
relevant population is consistent with the experimental evidence, even
strangers and one-time transactors will make relation-specific
investments in reliance on the promise of the other to pay.' We thus

37.

Ernst Fehr & Simon Gatcher, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of

Reciprocity, 14 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 159, 159 (2000) [hereinafter Fehr & Gitcher,

Fairnessand Retaliation].
Id.
38.
39.
See Scott, Indefinite Agreements, supra note 17, at 1665. This finding of
heterogeneity provides a convincing explanation for the apparent anomaly of the robust
evidence of reciprocal fairness in bilateral interactions and the equally robust evidence
from experiments in competitive markets where almost all subjects behave as if they
were self-interested. The central insight is that the observed behavior is a function of
the economic environment. In bilateral experiments, the presence of a fraction of
reciprocally fair individuals can create incentives for selfish types to make fair offers.
Alternatively, in a competitive market, a few selfish players can drive the price to the
competitive level, and no single fair person can affect that price. Fehr & Schmidt,
Fairnessand Reciprocity, supra note 36, at 38-40.
The reciprocal fairness experiments show that it pays to write trust
40.
contracts-that is, agreements based on observable but not verifiable conduct-even
where the promisee is uncertain whether the promisor is a fair or selfish type. So long
as the population is heterogeneous (that is, there is a significant fraction of fair types in
the population), then even where the transactors are anonymous, reciprocity yields better
enforcement outcomes in experimental settings on average than does the alternative of
This result is because even selfish parties will respond
coercive enforcement.
reciprocally to an offer to enter into a trust contract because of the positive probability
that the promisor will behave fairly. One reason that self enforcement is the better
strategy on average is that reciprocity is significantly less costly than third-party
enforcement. Scott, Indefinite Agreements, supra note 17, at 1683. Another reason is
that parties to self-enforcing agreements can condition performance on observable
factors that might not be verifiable to a third party, thus enhancing joint welfare. For
further discussion, see id. at 1682-85.
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must consider the existence and scope of the preference for reciprocal
fairness.
Notwithstanding the predictive power of this preference in
experimental settings, the theory has yet to be seriously tested in realworld contexts. Thus, any use of the fairness concept raises the
question of external validity. One critique of the experimental evidence
is particularly relevant to the application of reciprocal fairness theory to
explain international treaties-all of the experimental subjects are
untrained individuals and not professional bureaucrats or politicians.
Thus, it is unclear to what extent the observed behaviors, even if they
apply to the general population, also apply to the elites that affect
Individuals in laboratory
compliance with treaty obligations.
experiments may respond differently than state officers, for example,
because the experimental subjects do not face the same pressures to
make maximizing decisions.
We also note that the experimental evidence does not establish that
the observed preferences for reciprocity are a deeply entrenched,
intrinsic motivation and thus inconsistent with the assumption of rational
self-interest. Rather, the observed preference for reciprocity may be
either a learned or a normative behavior. It would be hardly surprising
if individuals learn to devise strategies, or heuristics, that do work in
real-world transactions that generally present a possibility of repeat-play
and reputational effect, and then fail to adjust those strategies to the pure
single-iteration game in the laboratory. 4
Moreover, there is evidence that cultures do generate norms of
reciprocity. These norms are consistent with individual self-interest to
the extent that, over time, parties will be better off if they behave fairly.
Following the over-time heuristic consistently, instead of making
distinctions for what appear to be one-shot interactions with strangers,
may be a successful, maximizing strategy.42 After all, sometimes one
might mistake a repeat-play game for a single-iteration game and get
punished or pay an unexpected reputational price. Thus, it is possible
that a rational individual could behave in the way the experimental
economists describe as reciprocally fair (and not utility-maximizing)

41.
On heuristics generally, see BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE
TOoLBOx (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2001).
Rational actors can profit from a precommitment strategy to guard against
42.
short-term deviations from behavior that would be inconsistent with their long-term
preferences. Thus, a rule such as, "respond reciprocally even in one-shot interactions
with strangers," may be a successful self-command strategy to guard against mistakes in
mischaracterizing repeat-play and isolated interactions. For discussion about the
relevance of self-command to contract theory, see Robert E. Scott, Errorand Rationality
in Individual Decisionmaking:An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions
and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 353-61 (1986).
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simply because the experiments do not take into account the costs of
categorizing, and miscategorizing, transactions. 03
These speculations do not challenge the experimental evidence so
The
much as suggest a context for appreciating its significance.
existence of a preference for reciprocal fairness does not undermine the
rational self-interest hypothesis. Rather, reciprocity extends the reach of
rational cooperation. Repeat-play, reputation, and a preference for
reciprocal fairness all explain why actors rationally police their own
behavior, obviating the need for external coercion. This potential for
self enforcement is not limitless, but even within a the conventional
framework of self-interested decision-making, self enforcement can
work to enhance joint welfare. We next turn to considering more fully
the relationship between repeat play and reputation, the more fully
studied mechanisms of self enforcement, and the newer reciprocalfairness research. Together these mechanisms provide the basis for a
theoretical approach to agreements based on what we will call rational
reciprocity.
2.

RATIONAL RECIPROCITY AS ADDING VALUE TO SELF ENFORCEMENT

We discussed above areas where repeat play and reputational
effects would not motivate rational actors to honor their obligations.
More general problems attend these mechanisms even within their
Parties who rely on either to enforce their
effective domains.
agreements face fundamental difficulties both in detecting a failure of
performance and in responding proportionately once nonperformance is
observed. The success of self enforcement depends significantly on the
clarity and predictability of the threatened responses to nonperformance.
Selecting an appropriate response to, say, an instance of shirking,
becomes more complicated when the other party's behavior cannot be
understood readily. Parties rarely shirk by directly announcing their
unwillingness to perform as promised. They typically affirm solidarity,
protest helplessness in the face of intractable problems, or act in subtle
ways that are difficult to evaluate. In other words, nonperformance is a
noisy signal and systematic misperception of the other's actions may
cause inappropriate responses."
Misunderstanding of an actor's behavior can result from many
sources, including reliance on a small sample size. Moreover, even if
participants can observe shirking behavior, third parties may be unable
43.
Scott, Indefinite Agreements, supra note 17, at 1674-75.
44.
For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Setear, Responses, supra note
15, at 85-91.
45.

ROBERT

JERVIS,

PERCEPTION

AND MISPERCEPTION

IN INTERNATIONAL

POLrICS 319-406 (1976); Setear, Responses, supra note 15, at 93-98.

2004:551

Self-Enforcing InternationalAgreements

569

to detect it.46 Thus, reputation works to make promissory commitments
credible only if other parties can conveniently learn about the reasons
why any particular transaction broke down.
A reputation for
trustworthiness can be difficult to establish, therefore, especially in
heterogeneous environments where most market participants are
unfamiliar with any particular contracting party. And the mere fact of
breakdown is not sufficient to impose a reputational cost on either party.
Even if shirking can be detected, the imposition of self-enforcing
sanctions must be carefully calibrated. Overdeterrence or excessive
retaliation by the counterparty functions as the equivalent of a breach
and presents serious moral-hazard problems. In addition to the risk of a
disproportionately harsh response, the parties also must consider the risk
of underenforcement, which will leave opportunism inadequately
deterred. High variance in the costs of performance thus poses a major
threat to an agreement that relies on the self-enforcing discipline of
repeated interactions. This variance in expected costs correlates to a
party's temptation to shirk its obligations to perform under the
agreement.
Self enforcement through the threat of a loss of reputation or repeat
transactions is not costless. It requires substantial monitoring and a
punitive sanction for nonperformance. Even if the breaching party
understands and accepts the punishment, retaliation imposes stress on
any ongoing relationship that may threaten its survival. All parties,
therefore, have an interest in augmenting their relationship within an
embedded framework based on reciprocity. The existence of such a
norm makes enforcement, when necessary, easier to administer and
accept. For example, and as we discuss in greater detail below, states
can use trust agreements based on reciprocity to encourage each other to
behave cooperatively long enough for them to discover a project's longrun benefits, thus bridging the gap between short-term and long-term
payoffs.
In sum, reciprocal fairness offers a particularly stable foundation
for a strategy of conditional cooperation. The strategy seems credible
because it relies on behavioral responses that go without saying. As a
consequence, it ameliorates problems of detection and proportionality.
A trust contract requires no monitoring other than a measured response
to the observable actions of the other party.47 When a selfish response is
observed, a reciprocally fair type will retaliate appropriately. 4g The
46.

See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.

47.
For a discussion of trust contracts, which depend on behavior that parties
can observe but not verify to a third party at a reasonable cost, see Scott, Indefinite
Agreements, supra note 17, at 1680-82.
48.
Reciprocity, whether learned, normative, or intrinsic, is deeply embedded
behavior. Thus, for example, the "eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth" formulation in
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contracting parties can observe and assess each other's behavior within
the context of the contract, rather than relying on general observations.
3.

COERCIVE THIRD-PARTY ENFORCEMENT

The preceding discussion demonstrates both the power of self
enforcement and the inherent limitations to any self-enforcement regime.
As we have observed, reputation and the discipline of repeated
interactions suffer from significant constraints. And while reciprocity
may be an effective means of self enforcement on average, it will also
have a high variance. Because there is both self-interest and reciprocity
in the world, an agreement that relies on reciprocal fairness would be
inefficient whenever a single act of nonperformance might lead to
serious disruptive effects. Moreover, where transactions are complex
and the respective promises interrelated, a failure to perform may not be
observable at the time, and thus reciprocity, which depends on a linkage
between action and response, may not work to make the promises
credible. At the time that parties exchange complex and interactive
performances, they may have difficulty determining whether one party's
refusal to respond cooperatively in a particular instance represents unfair
or selfish behavior or is an appropriately measured retaliatory response
to an earlier instance of shirking by the other. These complex
interactions are the sorts of agreements that private commercial parties
typically reduce to legally enforceable obligations."
For several reasons, then, coercive enforcement by third parties is a
desirable option in the optimal design of international agreements.' Self
enforcement, to be sure, involves coercion, and it also may entail third
parties who are empowered to determine the rights of the parties.
Coercive third-party enforcement as we mean the term, however,
requires both a disinterested arbiter and the arbiter's ability directly to
the Hammurabi Code was intended to restrict revenge by requiring a measured,
proportional response. THE HAMMURABI CODE AND THE SINAITIC LEGISLATION 61-62
(Chilperic Edwards trans., Kennikat Press ed. 1971) (1904). Also, consider the
thirteenth-century Norse epic verse, the Edda, which states: "A man ought to ... repay
gift with gift . . . and lies with treachery." Fehr & Gdtcher, Fairness and Retaliation,
supra note 37, at 159.
49.
Scott, Long-Term Contracts, supra note 16, at 2050-51.
50.
One of us has argued previously that third-party enforcement and self
enforcement regulate different aspects of the contractual relationship. On this view,
third-party enforcement functions much as a nuclear umbrella, deterring breach in those
states of the world where the payoffs from breach are substantial and exceed the range of
self enforcement. The other side of the argument is that reputation and repeated
interactions are effective, and where the payoffs are relatively low, self enforcement is a
more efficient conventional deterrent. See id. at 2044-48; see also Karen Eggleston et
al., The Design and Interpretationof Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L.
REv. 91, 116 (2000).
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impose sanctions on violators. This kind of arbiter can add value not
only by unraveling the chain of causation that produced the breakdown
but also by investing in resources to punish a breach itself rather than
leaving it to the parties to fashion a response. Moreover, the two
functions are complements: the ability to impose sanctions lends
credibility to the unraveling. As we discuss below, and contrary to
conventional assumptions, states do have the option of designing
external and coercive enforcement into their agreements.
The necessary conditions for external enforcement, then, are a
disinterested third-party referee and a stakeholder who can impose costs
or provide compensation for breach."
In the case of international
agreements, the choice of external enforcement can range from a
multilateral tribunal (think of the European Court of Justice), to thirdparty arbitration accessible to private persons, to domestic courts known
for their independence and endowed with credible coercive authority.2
Of course, the same institution can serve both functions. Because the
value of enforcement derives from its capacity to make credible the
promises of the respective parties, the imposition of costs can substitute
for the awarding of compensation. Thus, it is sufficient that the referee
can impose proportionate sanctions on the breaching party, even if the
referee cannot provide compensation for the breach once it occurs.
4.

DESIGNING OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT

If our hypothetical states have enforcement choices ranging from
self enforcement to coercive enforcement, then how do they design an
enforcement regime for any particular agreement that maximizes the
contractual surplus? The optimal means of enforcement in any given
case will depend on the effects of asymmetric information on the relative
costs of the enforcement options, including both direct costs and error
costs.

51.
Honesty and independence are perhaps the most salient attributes of a
disinterested referee. Absence of these attributes helps to explain the relatively low

levels of foreign direct investment that private parties have made in countries with weak
judicial systems, which prevents the local parties from making believable promises. See
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3-6 (1990); Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453, 468
(2003); Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, FinancialDevelopment, Property Rights, and
Growth, 58 J. Fin. 2401, 2401-02 (2003); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection
and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 1147 (2002); Paul Mahoney, The Common
Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 503, 506-07

(2001).
52.
We discuss the details of these institutions in Part II. See discussion infra
notes 122-71 and accompanying text.
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The Effects of Asymmetric Information

The existence of asymmetric information truncates the set of
agreements that states can write. This point requires more careful
unpacking. Consider an information taxonomy found in the contract
theory literature. Information economics attaches analytic importance to
the distinction between observable and verifiable information, but both
concepts remain somewhat imprecise. According to standard theory, a
datum of information is "unobservable" if the other contracting party
cannot perceive it. A datum of information is "observable but not
verifiable" if the other party can perceive it but cannot prove the fact to
a court or other third party at an acceptable cost. A datum of
information thus is "verifiable" if a party both can observe it and
efficiently prove its existence to a third party.
The field of international relations abounds with examples of both
unobservable and unverifiable information. 53 States work very hard to
keep laboratory research on weapons systems or intelligence collection
unobservable.

At a less dramatic level, states rarely can determine

another state's costs in maintaining a particular tariff or exercising some
range of regulatory authority, in part because of the difficulty of
ascertaining the policy set of alternative regulatory choices. As for
nonverifiability, consider the frequent problem in trade relations when
an acute industry downturn leads to safeguard protection against import
competition. Victims of such barriers may be able to distinguish
genuine claims of domestic injury from lax commitment to trade4
obligations, but third parties have great difficulty separating the two.5
Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner question the significance of
53.
information asymmetries in explaining international relations. They argue that:
Most states these days are open, or do a poor job of keeping their secrets
(and those insulated states, like North Korea, are for that reason assumed to
be "bad types," in an example of the classic unraveling result in games of
asymmetric information), and one can obtain a fair indication of a state's
political stability by consulting the market's valuation of its bonds.
Goldsmith & Posner, InternationalAgreements, supra note 8, at 137. Their argument
focuses only on observability and not verifiability. See id. Market valuation of bonds
exemplifies a process by which observers reliably may observe information, in the sense
that they are willing to place bets on it in the bond market, but have great difficulty
convincing a third party of the link between a particular event and a particular change in
See Kim Oosterlinck, Why Do Investors Still Hope? The Soviet
bond prices.
Repudiation Puzzle (1918-1919) 2-4 (Univ. Libe de Bruxelles, Solvay Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. WP-CEB 03/010, 2003) (documenting the unverifiability of events
affecting bond prices).
54.
For an instance illustrating the difficulty in ascertaining the strength of
domestic injury that justifies the use of rules that force a protecting state to signal its
circumstances by absorbing higher costs, see Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a
"Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GAIT "Escape Clause" with Normative
Speculations, 58 U. CHt. L. REV. 255, 256-58 (1991). For evidence that third parties
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Alternatively, some evidence exists that human-rights advocates
concentrate their efforts-largely involving the production of
reputational sanctions-on state acceptance of human rights obligations,
rather than on state compliance, because of the difficulty of verifying the
latter relative to the former. 5
From the foregoing it follows that parties will contract for thirdparty enforcement only where the relevant measures of performance are
verifiable. Otherwise, the uninformed party will be subject to risks of
Take, for example, the
hidden action and hidden information.
hypothetical agreement between State A and State B for the production
of a specialized good. Assume that State B is unable to observe whether
State A has, in fact, invested $2000 in production costs. Because of the
moral-hazard risk of hidden action, State B will decline to condition its
promised payment on whether the promised investment was made.
Instead, State B will write a contract that conditions its performance on
the verifiable quality of the good produced by State A's investment. The
problem for the parties, however, is that the quality required by State B
may not be verifiable. If so, the parties must write a second-best
contract that conditions performance on a less relevant but verifiable
quality.
An inability to observe a relevant condition will further limit the
ability of states to obtain maximum value from potential transactions. In
our example, State B might be willing to pay a premium for the highest
quality specialized good if it knew that State A had the skill to produce
it. But if State B is unable to observe whether the producers in State A
are skilled or unskilled, State B is vulnerable to the risk of hidden
information (or adverse selection). Because State B cannot observe
State A's type, State B will pay only a blended price that reflects the
probability that State A's workers are unskillful. Unless states endowed
with skilled workers can somehow communicate that information, they
will be unable to compete with the unskilled workers in other states at
the blended price.5 6 In short, if the value one party derives from
have difficulty verifying the strength of domestic forces triggering safeguard measures,
see, for example, REP. OF THE APPELLATE BODY, WTO, UNITED STATES-SAFEGUARD
MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF FRESH, CHILLED OR FROZEN LAMB MEAT FROM NEW ZEALAND

AND AUSTRALIA, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DSa78/AB/R (May 1, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org (reviewing the legitimacy of U.S. safeguard measures under the

Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards and relying on second-order observations to
justify determination).
See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
55.
111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2007-08 (2002).
This inability to compete is based on the assumption that it is more costly
56.

to train skilled workers than unskilled workers. See generally George Akerloff, The
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON.
488, 494-95 (1970).
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performance depends on the characteristics or actions of the other party,
then the inability to observe those characteristics or actions will render
the performance in question not contractible.
b.

Screening and Signaling with PreliminaryAgreements

In this Article, as in standard contract theory, we treat verifiability
as an exogenous variable." Observability, however, is an endogenous
variable. Parties can overcome some information deficits by using
screening or signaling mechanisms. For example, assume that State A
and State B are contemplating a long-term investment agreement for a
specialized good. Assume that the quality of the specialized good is
observable to State B but cannot be efficiently verified to a third party.
Under these circumstances, the parties have an incentive to write a selfenforcing agreement, because the specialized performance otherwise is
not contractible. But assume that State A has no history with State B
that provides the basis for a reputation for trustworthiness; nor does the
prospect of future interactions discipline State A's behavior. State A
might propose a trust contract that relies on State B's generosity to
respond in kind once State A invests, but State A is unable to observe
whether State B is reciprocally fair or selfish. The assumption of
heterogeneity implies, therefore, that State A risks losing a major
investment by responding with enhanced efforts to a selfish party who
subsequently fails to perform.
One solution is for the parties to design a screening mechanism so
that State A can determine State B's preference for reciprocity. For
example, State A and State B can enter into a preliminary agreement in
which State B promises to pay State A for investing the necessary efforts
to produce one unit of the specialized economic good and to pay State A
a bonus if the product proves satisfactory to State B. This preliminary
agreement, simple in form, offers a clearly defined opportunity to
reciprocate. It thus permits the parties to learn more about each other's
taste for reciprocal fairness. 58 In this case, potential transactors are not
57.
The assumption that verifiability is exogenous is made for convenience,
but, in fact, whether a measure of performance is verifiable or not is subject to some
party control. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Measurement Distortionand Missing
Contingencies in Optimal Contracts, 2 EcON. THEORY 1, 2-4 (1992); see also Chris

Sanchirico & George G. Triantis, Evidence Arbitrage: The Fabricationof Evidence and
the Verifiability of Contract Performance 2-4 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Law and
Econ., Working Paper No. 02-17, 2002).

58.
Scott, Indefinite Agreements, supra note 17, at 1683. The fact that State B
is willing to enter an agreement that conditions on nonverifiable factors does not
necessarily signal that it is reciprocally fair. A selfish state could copy the signal, as the

invitation to reciprocate would induce greater efforts from State A and thus greater
returns to the informed party.

But the preliminary agreement itself creates several
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only subject to observation but also must spend considerable time
Because
carrying out an agreement that is only self-enforcing.
reciprocally fair individuals can capture the returns to general
information about their type through an enhanced reputation for
cooperation, they are more willing to spend resources to provide this
information.5 9
We do not wish to overstate the efficacy of preliminary agreements.
If the cost of exhibiting cooperative behavior were less than the potential
gains to be achieved subsequently from exploiting counterparty reliance,
parties rationally would discount the value of the signal. Our point is
simply that in some circumstances, self enforcement can extend the
scope of contractual space by compensating for the deficiencies of thirdparty enforcement.
c.

The Directand Error Costs of Enforcement

The distinction between observable and verifiable facts is key to
understanding what motivates parties to choose between self
enforcement and third-party enforcement. Enforcement, as a conceptual
matter, entails two categories of costs: (1) direct costs, comprising (a)
investments in detecting and verifying breach and in imposing sanctions,
and (b) foregone opportunities from writing second-best contracts that
condition performance on less relevant but verifiable factors; and (2)
error costs, entailing losses in welfare derived from both failures to
recognize and sanction nonperformance (Type I errors) and incorrect
determinations that breaches have occurred (Type II errors). Parties
should seek to minimize the sum of these costs, given any particular
distribution of observable and verifiable facts relevant to the obligation
to be enforced. 6°
To illustrate how problems of private information influence the
trade-off between the direct costs and the error costs of enforcement,
opportunities to reciprocate in advance of the formalization of a long-term relationship
between the parties. First, a preliminary agreement gives State A the opportunity to
acquire information about the character of State B by observing its behavior in response
to opportunities to reciprocate. Second, the preliminary agreement separates in time the
opportunity to reciprocate from the subsequent transaction that is ultimately
contemplated. The expenditure of time itself communicates a valuable signal of a
preference for reciprocity. See A. Michael Spence, Time and Communication in
Economic and Social Interaction, 87 Q.J. EcON. 651, 651 (1973).
59. A reciprocally fair party will not only earn a portion of the enhanced
surplus in this transaction, but, by revealing her type (assume the bonus is paid), she
will be able to develop a reputation for fairness that can be exploited at lower cost in
future transactions. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of "Screening," Education, and
the Distribution of Income, 65 AM. EcON. REV. 283, 286-87 (1975).

60. Robert E. Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor
Remedies: The Cost of ProceduralDue Process, 61 VA.L. REV. 807, 844-46 (1975).
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assume that the elites acting on behalf of the states in our hypothetical
world behave as if they have the preferences for reciprocity revealed in
laboratory experiments. This assumption implies that self enforcement
will be effective in a wide range of transactions not involving close-knit
communities or established ongoing relationships. If reciprocal fairness
is a potent complement to these traditional means of self enforcement,
then it might extend to one-shot investment agreements between states
with no prior transactional history.
In any transaction in which self enforcement is an available option,
the direct costs of self enforcement typically will be less than the direct
costs of coercive enforcement. Self enforcement only requires an actor
to expend costs to observe the behavior of the counterparty, while
coercive enforcement requires the parties to expend additional resources
in verifying that behavior to a third party.6'
Moreover, where
significant measures of performance are observable but not verifiable,
the direct costs of enforcement will include both the resources expended
in verification, as well as the welfare losses from writing second-best
contracts. Self enforcement, on the other hand, permits parties to make
credible promises regarding nonverifiable measures of performance,
thus increasing joint surplus.62 If direct enforcement costs were the only
consideration, then self enforcement would generally be both cheaper
and better than third-party enforcement.
But the advantages of self enforcement are limited by two
constraints. First, the farther parties are from environments in which
reciprocity can be predicted to work, the greater the risk that a selfenforcing sanction will not be credible. Second, and perhaps more
significant, self enforcement requires what we have termed "moral
clarity": each party must be able to observe and properly characterize
61.
There are conditions under which the parties' direct costs of self
enforcement may exceed that of coercive enforcement. This situation would occur
where the promisee has to expend resources in undertaking a punitive sanction for
observable defection (say, a proportionate retaliation or a refusal to deal) and where the
imposition of a coercive sanction was subsidized by the state. Under these conditions
the cost of imposing a self-enforcing sanction may exceed the costs of verifying the
breach to a third party.
62.
Self-enforcing agreements may also help to solve a multitasking problem.
Assume, for example, that State A's performance involves both verifiable and
unverifiable tasks. An agreement that was conditioned only on the verifiable tasks
would be inefficient. Linking verifiable performance measures to compensation will
cause State A to substitute away from the nonverifiable tasks to the compensated
verifiable tasks, thus impairing overall performance,
Bengt Holmstrom & Paul
Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership,
and Job Design, 7 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 24, 25-36 (1991). Self-enforcing agreements can
avoid this problem by making any reward for cooperation dependant on the overall
performance of all tasks. Ernst Fehr et al., Fairness, Incentives and Contractual
Incompleteness 26-29 (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working
Paper No. 72, 2001), availableat http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp072.pdf.
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instances of primary misbehavior or nonperformance and distinguish
them from justifiable retaliatory responses.63 Accordingly, declines in
the moral clarity of breaches will generate higher error costs for self
enforcement relative to external enforcement.
Whenever the transactions are complex and the sequence of
performances interrelated, moral clarity dissipates. Either party can
mistakenly label a justifiable retaliation as a breach and vice versa. In
these environments, third-party referees serve a valuable function by
calling fouls. A disinterested observer may be in a better position to
sort out complex behavior and, by blowing the whistle, can both
empower the aggrieved party to respond in kind and forestall further
retaliation by the breacher. A constraint on this capacity, however,
would be the presence of observable but unverifiable factors. The thirdparty observer adds value only in cases where moral clarity dissipates at
a greater rate than does verifiability.
Any calculation of the costs of enforcement thus must balance the
higher direct costs of coercive enforcement against the potentially higher
error costs of self enforcement. Those error costs are particularly
salient in the cases of complex agreements between nations with no
history nor a necessary future. When expected error costs exceed the
expected direct costs, the optimal enforcement regime will opt for some
form of coercive third-party enforcement.
5.

COMPLEMENTARITY AND RIVALRY IN ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

Finally, one must consider the possible interaction of multipleenforcement mechanisms on each other. Three possibilities exist: the
mechanisms may be independent, in that increasing one will have no
effect on the benefits derived from increasing the others; they may be
rivalrous, in that increasing one will decrease the returns from outlays
on others; or they may be complements, in that increasing one will
increase the benefits from others at no additional cost.
It seems plausible that the three aspects of self-enforcing
mechanisms-retaliatory threats based on repeat transactions, reputation,
and reciprocity-are complements. Even in particular cases where the
pull of retaliatory threats and reputation may be weak, such as with the
emergence of new regimes, states may learn to reciprocate because
reciprocation pays off in many transactions over time. Reciprocation
may also induce a virtuous cycle in which engaging in cooperative
behavior increases a regime's preference for more cooperative behavior.
Successful cooperation that generates a reputation for trustworthiness or
produces returns in ongoing transactions both furthers a regime's self63.

See Setear, Politics, supra note 6, at 666-75.
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interest and causes parties to learn to care more about the other party's
payoff.
This, in turn, may strengthen a regime's willingness to
reciprocate voluntarily even when the prospect of retaliation is quite
low.'
Some experimental evidence regarding individuals does support this
claim of complementarity. 6' Experiments have compared the effort
levels of subjects who were given a single anonymous opportunity to
respond to generous offers with the effort levels in a similar game in
which repeated interactions created the additional opportunity for
retaliation. 6
The results are that while a significant fraction of
individuals were motivated by reciprocity in the one-shot, anonymous
transaction, repeated interactions caused a significant increase in the
effort level.
Theorists have not settled on a single explanation for why this
complementarity exists between reciprocity and retaliation, and these
studies remain subject to the same reservations that we expressed above
about the experiments that produced evidence of a preference for
reciprocal fairness. 67 Nonetheless, the evidence seems sufficient to
justify speculation
about
what might drive
the observed
complementarity. One conjecture notes that the properties of incentives
created by repeated interactions are similar to the properties of
incentives created by invitations to reciprocate. 68
Self-enforcing
incentives are imposed implicitly and ex post. Thus, for example, in a
repeat game, tit-for-tat framework, a party can punish a defection ex
post without risking offense to a potential cooperator by announcing in
advance a sanction for defection.69
By contrast, incentives based on coercive enforcement are explicit
and ex ante.'0
The difference in their nature might make these
64.

See Frans van Dijk et al., Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment, 85 J.

PUB. ECON. 275, 276-77, 290-91 (2002).
65.
See Gary Charness, Responsibility and Effort in an Experimental Labor
Market, 42 J. EON. BEHAV. & ORG. 375, 376-77 (2000); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk,
Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market, 107 J. POL. ECON. 106,
107-09 (1999); Ernst Fehr et al., Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive
Experimental Markets, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 1, 2-4 (1998); Fehr et al., Reciprocity,

supra note 36, at 833-36; Fehr & Schmidt, Fairnessand Reciprocity, supra note 36, at
6-7; see also Simon Gachter & Armin Falk, Reputation or Reciprocity: Consequences
for the Labor Relation 13-14 (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ.,
Working Paper No. 19, 1999).
66.
Martin Brown et al., ContractualIncompleteness and the Nature of Market
Interactions 8, 27 (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working
Paper No. 38, 2001).
67.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
68.
Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46
EUR. ECON. REV. 687, 701-04 (2002).
69.
70.

See Scott, Indefinite Agreements, supra note 17, at 1681.
Fehr & Falk, supra note 65, at 703-04.
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incentives rivalrous with those that operate implicitly and ex post.
Experimental data indicate that, when offered a trust contract, a
substantial number of individuals will both pay higher prices and extend
higher levels of effort than narrow self-interest would dictate. 7' When
offered the same choices plus the possibility of obtaining a monetary
sanction if the promisor shirks, the average price offered by buyers and
the average effort given by sellers was lower.72 Without coercive
enforcement, reciprocal fairness generates high levels of performance.
But once the interaction is backed by coercion, reciprocity declines and
overall performance is reduced. 73 These experimental results suggest
that self-enforcing motivations based on reciprocity and explicit coercive
incentives may indeed be in conflict with each other. In particular,
coercive enforcement may crowd out behavior based on reciprocal
fairness ."

Why might reciprocal fairness and repeated interactions
complement each other while reciprocal fairness functions as the rival of
coercive enforcement? One conjecture focuses on the fact that coercive
third-party enforcement is structured as a zero-sum game in which the
71.
See generally Ernst Fehr & Simon Gdtcher, Do Incentives Contracts
Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research on
Econ.,
Working
Paper
No.
34,
2002),
available
at
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp034.pdf [hereinafter Fehr & Gitcher, Voluntary
Cooperation].
72.
Id. at 11.
73.
There are two primary reasons why the amount of voluntary cooperation
declined when the contract was enforceable coercively. First, shirking by sellers
increased. This was true even where the expected costs of shirking exceeded the
expected returns to the seller. Second, reciprocity either in the form of generous offers
by buyers or reciprocating efforts by sellers vanished almost completely. Where
shirking was expected to payoff for the sellers, they chose the minimum effort in the
vast majority of cases. In addition, in those instances where buyers offered more
generous prices above the minimum, sellers did not reciprocate with greater efforts. For
further discussion, see id. at 15-18.
There are other experiments that have reported similar effects from the
introduction of coercive enforcement. See generally Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with
Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding (Harvard Univ., John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, KSG Working Paper No. 00-009, 2000); Uri Gneezy & Aldo
Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price. 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). Extensive literature in social
psychology also considers the crowding out of intrinsic motivations. See, e.g., Edward
L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic
Rewards on IntrinsicMotivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 627-28, 658-59 (1999).
74.
Scott, Indefinite Agreements, supra note 17, at 1689-91. The experimental
research on crowding out is still at a preliminary stage. Thus, we do not currently
understand precisely why or when reciprocity and voluntary cooperation will be
undermined by coercive enforcement. There is some evidence, however, that framing
effects influence the crowding-out phenomenon. For example, if the explicit incentive is
framed as a bonus from a base offer rather than as a fine for nonperformance, the levels
of reciprocity are considerably greater. See Fehr & Gatcher, Voluntary Cooperation,
supra note 71, at 26-30.
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promisee threatens ex ante to sanction the promisor for subsequent
nonperformance. The explicit ex ante nature of coercive sanctions may
undermine the instinct to reciprocate. Fair types may regard the threat
of coercive enforcement as simply unfair as they are willing to
reciprocate voluntarily, while selfish types may interpret the threat of
sanction through third-party enforcement as a signal that the promisee is
unlikely to be a reciprocator. 75 The same explicit threat does not exist in
the case of repeated interactions where the implicit sanction (terminating
the relationship) is imposed ex post and only after defection has been
observed. In that sense, ex post punishment may be perceived as fairer
than the ex ante announcement of sanctions for breach of an obligation.
Another conjecture, derived from the apparent preference for
fairness and studies of reputational sanctions, proposes that group
solidarity may reduce the free-riding problem associated with retaliatory
enforcement of collective informal sanctions but play no role in formal
coercive actions. Parties may consider it fair to absorb some costs in
the monitoring and sanctioning of others, if they regard this burden as
borne generally. Assignment of a special role to a specific entity,
however, may undermine a sense of fairly shared collective
responsibility.
Establishing a person or process responsible for
enforcing an agreement may induce others to specialize away from
enforcement. Finally, the reputational benefits derived from being seen
to cooperate may diminish if the audience perceives the behavior as the
product of coercion.
C. Summary
In this Part, we have argued that states design their bilateral and
multilateral agreements to be enforceable when they wish to make
relation-specific investments that otherwise would not be made. It is
well understood that self-enforceable agreements are an alternative to
third-party coercive enforcement. Where self enforcement is effective,
it is more efficient than third-party enforcement because it better
responds to the effects of asymmetric information.
Contract theorists traditionally have believed that self enforcement
is limited to contexts where reputation or repeated interactions are
75.
Another speculation that might explain crowding out is the perception that
coercion is a hostile action. A coercive sanction is always framed as a threat ("If you do
not perform, then I will invoke authority ....").To the extent that intentions matter in
motivating reciprocity, the ex ante threat may be interpreted as a hostile intention. A
liquidated-damages clause in a contract may thus be perceived as an indication of
distrust. If sellers perceive the damages clause as a hostile act, then they may be less
willing to put forth the same quality of efforts as compared to a situation in which the
first mover sends a trusting signal. Fehr & Ggtcher, Voluntary Cooperation, supra note
71, at 14.
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sufficient to make promises credible.76 Recent work in experimental
economics suggests that reciprocal fairness is a potent supplement to the
traditional means of self enforcement.77 But this expansive view of the
potential of self enforcement does not mean that parties to international
agreements have no need to create mechanisms that rely on third-party
enforcement. Self-enforcing agreements have a common feature: the
agreements are simple in form, clear in commitment, and are structured
to create opportunities for parties to reciprocate in ways that expand the
contractual surplus.78 When interstate investment depends on complex
agreements where performance is interactive, the high error costs of self
enforcement argue for mechanisms that provide a means of verifying
performance and nonperformance to a third-party referee.
The preceding analysis has sought to demonstrate that a contract
theory approach to international agreements between states offers a
useful framework for both positive explanation and normative critique.
A particular feature of the framework that we have developed focuses on
what we call rational reciprocity. In the next Part, we relax the
restrictive assumptions of our informal model in order to apply the
insights of the rational-reciprocity approach in a more realistic setting.
II.

THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Self enforcement is a pervasive, but not exclusive, mechanism to
give instrumental effect to international agreements. Here we examine
this point in some detail.
International agreements invoke self
enforcement, but treaties also rely on other strategies to promote
compliance.
We explore three such alternatives: (1) third-party
arbitration of claims brought by nongovernmental actors; (2) accept-ng
76.
See generally Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing
Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 EcON. INQUIRY 444 (1996); Benjamin Klein &
Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 615 (1981); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus.
27 (1980).
77.
Whether reciprocal fairness is a learned behavior that derives from the
benefits of cooperation in repeated interactions, or instead is an intrinsic motivation,
remains an open question. But the evidence suggests that the domain of self-enforcing
agreements extends to environments in which a reputation for trustworthiness and the
discipline of ongoing relationships are relatively weak forces. See Scott, Indefinite
Agreements, supra note 17, at 1674-75.
78.
Where transactions are complex and the respective promises interrelated, a
failure to perform a promise may not be obvious and thus reciprocity may not serve to
make the promises credible. Given the highly interactive nature of the respective
obligations of each party, it may be difficult to know, for example, whether one party's
refusal to respond cooperatively in a particular case represents unfair or selfish behavior
or an appropriately measured, retaliatory response to an earlier instance of
noncooperation by the other. Scott, Long-Term Contracts, supra note 16, at 2050-51.
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the jurisdiction of a dispute-resolution body embedded in important
institutional relationships; and (3) authorizing independent domestic
courts to entertain claims based on an agreement. Each possesses the
critical elements of coercive third-party enforcement: persons affected
by violations-and not just the states who are parties to the agreementmay present their claim to a disinterested third party that has the
authority and capacity to impose substantial sanctions on the violator.
Each may substitute or supplement self enforcement. We illustrate how
the particular enforcement strategies used by these agreements are
broadly consistent with the rational-reciprocity approach.
A.

Self Enforcement

A wide array of international arrangements induce cooperation
without invoking external coercion to induce compliance. Arms-control
agreements, joint ventures for the production of advanced military
technology, OECD recommendations on international competition
policy, the Basel Accords on capital adequacy standards for financial
institutions, and myriad other instruments and concordats constitute a
body of commitments that operate without regard to formal means of
enforcement.79 Other agreements contain elaborate dispute-resolution
provisions but rely ultimately on self enforcement to induce compliance.
We examine in detail the mechanisms of self enforcement implicated by
these arrangements and explain why states agree to them, rather than
other enforcement mechanisms.
1.

COUNTERPARTY RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Observers have noted that "almost all nations observe all principles
of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time," but a comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon remains
elusive.80 In a wide range of instances, compliance occurs without the
Our examples in text include both agreements that the parties intend to
79.
have "legal force" but invoke no third-party coercive enforcement mechanism, and "soft
law" that by its own terms creates no legal obligation. See Goldsmith & Posner,
InternationalAgreements, supra note 8, at 122-34 (surveying the field of "soft law" and
providing a positive theory for choice of no formal enforcement). Goldsmith and Posner
focus on the decision whether to invoke a sense of legal obligation under international

law. We, by contrast, examine specific enforcement mechanisms, and in particular, self
enforcement. We observe that the practice of states tends to relegate both soft law and a

wide array of formal treaty commitments to self enforcement, although some
mechanisms of self enforcement (such as WTO dispute resolution) entail a higher degree
of formality than do others.
80.
Compare Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 49 (1979); with Thomas
M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 705, 705 (1988).
Franck states:
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operation of any formal third-party enforcement mechanism. Before we
consider what third-party enforcement does, we must have some
understanding of how self-enforcing agreements work in the context of
international commitments.
To draw on contract theory to understand international bargaining,
we first must specify how state-to-state negotiations resemble private
contracting. In the case of private contracts, contract theory starts with
the assumption that contractors seek to maximize their joint welfare. In
the case of states, we have to specify more carefully who the contractors
are and under what institutional constraints they operate.
First, we relax our previous assumption that governing elites seek
to maximize national welfare. Drawing on rational choice theory in
international relations, we assume instead that each state has a political
elite that seeks to maximize its own welfare and faces uncertainty about
the future."' Importantly, we suppose that the institutional constraints on
the ability of political elites to pursue self-interested goals varies
according to the characteristics of the domestic regime. s States ruled by
dictatorships or other authoritarian regimes constrain the leaders only in
the sense that some choices might lead to an unacceptably high risk of
Constitutional democracies with
domestic or foreign overthrow.
separation of powers, in contrast, constrain the political elite both
through mandated power sharing and checks-and-balances arrangements
and by posing a risk of electoral defeat.
The recognition that political elites are agents who pursue their own
self-interest raises the question of whether rent-seeking may distort their
behavior. We concede the possibility that this phenomenon exists but it
does not fundamentally affect our analysis. We will assume that elites
do select enforcement mechanisms that are designed to maximize the
surplus from their international commitments. After all, political elites
seek rents either by diverting wealth to themselves or to the interest
groups they represent. In any case, elites have no interest in degrading

The surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its
strictures or carry out its mandates. This observation is made not to register
optimism that the half-empty glass is also half-full, but to draw attention to a
pregnant phenomenon: that most states observe systemic rules much of the
time in their relations with other states.
Franck, supra, at 705.
81.
See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 7, 43-44
(1999).
82.
Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 448-50 (1988) (exploring interactions between
international relations and domestic politics).
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the quality of their international agreements; these agreements create the
wealth they may then attempt to divert.8 3
We focus on elites and regimes, rather than states, to capture the
important phenomenon that regime-changes alter both the internally
known preferences and the externally manifested characteristics of the
political elite. 84 In form, international agreements bind states, but more
realistically they bind political elites. A regime-change may alter the
elite's preferences, and thus its susceptibility to retaliatory threats.
Furthermore, we assume that reputations attach to regimes more
than to states. A change in regime thus can dissipate the reputational
effects of a prior elite's behavior. Without this assumption, one would
have to assume that reputational effects are pervasive and strong in
almost all international agreements, as states qua states demonstrate
considerable durability.8 5 In a world of durable states, almost all would
have to anticipate future interactions with other states, even for those
states not engaged in extensive repeat transactions with other states.
The turnover of regimes explains why something more than reputation-

Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 17, at 550-51. We
83.
acknowledge that we have only partly relaxed the assumption of no agency costs in
regime behavior, inasmuch as we do not specifically consider the possibility of a regime
acting as an agent for particular groups, such as producers, and how domestic principals
might approach enforcement. One of us has explored this problem in general, but not its
effect on the choice of enforcement mechanisms. See generally Paul B. Stephan,
Accountability and InternationalLawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1997) [hereinafter Stephan, Accountability]; Paul B. Stephan,
BarbariansInside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and InternationalEconomic Law, 10
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995); Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal
Unification-The Agency Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 333 (2002); Paul B. Stephan, The
Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 743 (1999) [hereinafter Stephan, Futility]. Our present intuition is that the
agency costs in the regime-domestic constituency relationship do not detract from our
argument, but we leave it to later work to explore this issue.
We use the term "regime" to refer to the domestic constellation of
84.
personnel and structures that generate a state's choices about international relations. We
emphatically do not wish our usage to be confused with the conventional use of
"regime" by international-relations theorists to refer to the international structures that
condition the choices of states in their dealings with each other. For outstanding
examples of regime theory in the international-relations sense of the term, see generally
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); ROBERT O. KEOHANE,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY (1989); Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L
ORG. 325 (1982).

See generally Tanisha N. Fazal, State Death in the InternationalSystem, 58
85.
INT'L ORG. 311 (2004); John K. Setear, Taking Both Biology and InternationalLaw
Seriously: Evolutionary Biology, Neo-Realist Theories of InternationalRelations, and the
Promise(s) of InternationalLaw (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Papers, Working Paper No. 03-19, 2003) (observing low rates of state death in
modem era).
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based sanctions by the international community is needed to enforce
international agreements.
For purposes of our analysis, we will not seek to define either elite
or regime too tightly and instead will rely on soft sociological intuitions
about these concepts. On the one hand, a political elite can remain
stable even as it undergoes gradual evolutionary change. On the other
hand, a state can exhibit continuity in its type of government but
experience regime-change. Consider, for example, an authoritarian
state where one ruling clique ousts another, in the process purging the
political and technocratic leadership. The new clique, we assume, has
some capacity to disavow the actions of its predecessors and thus avoid
at least some of the benefits and burdens of its predecessor's reputation,
even though the form of government remains the same. Conversely, a
stable political system can change its leaders without altering either its
regime or the governing elite. Thus we assume that the normal
replacement of one political party by another in a democratic parliament
or executive does not dissipate a state's reputation regarding
international relations any more than, historically, changes in the
identity of the Party General Secretary affected the Soviet Union's core
preferences or reputation.'
Once one considers these distinguishing attributes of states, it seems
evident that the threat of future retaliation can induce parties to an
international agreement to honor their obligations. As the rationalreciprocity approach predicts, many international pacts involve mutual
commitments to forego actions that would benefit the promisor and harm
the promisee, such as increasing armaments or raising tariffs. Where
the benefits and costs foregone are sufficiently symmetrical between the
parties and project reliably into the future, a promisee can credibly
threaten to punish a defaulting promisor by claiming the benefits and
inflicting the costs that the agreement otherwise precludes. In a bilateral
arms treaty, such as the several nuclear arms agreements between the
Soviet Union and the United States, each party had an incentive to
adhere to its obligations to the extent that the other party had the
capacity to respond to breaches by augmenting its arms beyond the
treaty limits. 8

86.
For an insightful study of the role of enduring attributes of the Soviet
Union in influencing its foreign policy, in addition to the impact of leadership changes,
see generally MORTON SCHWARTZ, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR: DOMEsTIc

FACTORS (1975).
87.
Posner has offered a clever example of how retaliatory threats can work
independently of reputational incentives. He speculates as to why states generally
comply with international conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war. See
generally Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of International Law: Comments on
Conference Papers, J. LEGAL. STD. S321 (2002). When engaged in war, states may
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The efficacy of retaliatory threats in these agreements depends on
two factors: the ease of detection of defections from the agreement and
the ability of the parties to make credible and symmetrical retaliatory
threats. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, for example, did not specify any
observable, much less verifiable, conditions short of armed invasion that
would constitute a breach and thus pushed back detection to the point
where retaliation would be indistinguishable from the self-preserving
actions that would occur in the absence of any agreement." Moreover,
wish to have a reputation for dangerous, even irrational ferocity but still adhere to
minimum standards of decency regarding prisoners:
If both sides hold the same number of prisoners, each has a simple and
effective means of retaliation if its opponent mistreats its prisoners. If one
has very few prisoners relative to the other, this means it is probably losing
the war and so will fear punishment if it mistreats its few prisoners; also
there will be few benefits, since the cost of maintaining only a few prisoners
will be small. The winning side, which holds a disproportionate number of
prisoners, can afford to maintain them, precisely because it is winning, and
so has little to gain from mistreating them, especially since there is some,
though perhaps only a small, risk that its opponent will retaliate against the
prisoners that it holds.
Id. at S325. For virtually the same argument as Posner's in a judicial opinion, see
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
This conjecture, however, opens up another puzzle: why do states bother to codify
the rules regarding prisoners of war if they know they will face retaliation if they lose?
During World War II, for example, Japan was not a signatory to the 1929 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, but after the war the United
States, still held war crime trials and executed many Japanese soldiers for mistreating
U.S. prisoners. See generally PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: WAR
CRIMES OPERATIONS INTHE EAST, 1945-1951 (1979). One possibility is to regard some
instruments not as contracts, but rather as a form of coordination. From this perspective
a state adheres to the Geneva Conventions not only to bind itself, but to announce to
potential future adversaries what standards it will apply to their conduct. A state might
join such an agreement to limit its obligations to those contained in the text, rather than
facing the uncertain standards of victors' justice. As this speculation takes us away from
the analysis of agreements and into the realm of so-called customary international law
(see supra note 5) we will not pursue it further.
88.
The secret protocol associated with the pact did permit the parties to take
some concrete steps to signal cooperation. This instrument divided up Poland between
the two powers and committed Germany not to interfere with Soviet occupation of the
then-independent Baltic republics. Secret Additional Protocol, supra note 10, at 246-47.
It appears that the clarity of the dispositions contained in these protocols, unlike the
ongoing nonaggression obligation, lent themselves to self enforcement. We concede,
however, that the creation of a common border between the two powers where buffer
states had existed did have some of the elements of a trust agreement. For the follow-on
agreements that fixed the border after the joint liquidation of Poland, see German-Soviet
Boundary and Friendship Treaty, Sept. 28, 1939, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., translated in 8
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1918-1945, Ser. D, at 164-65 (1956);
Confidential Protocol, Sept. 28, 1939, F.R.G. -U.S.S.R., translatedin 8 DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1918-1945, supra, at 165; Secret Additional Protocol, Sept.
28, 1939, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., translatedin 8 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY:
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exogenous changes-Germany's easy conquest of Western Europe and
the consequent removal of an immediate military threat to its west-led
Hitler to devalue the benefits of avoiding an armed conflict with the
Soviet Union. In other words, as of the spring of 1941 the cost of
Soviet retaliation no longer seemed sufficient to induce German
compliance with its obligations under the pact. The Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact thus illustrates an international agreement with extremely weak self
enforcement. Put differently, the pact exhibited great vulnerability to
end-game problems.
The events that resulted from the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact suggest
another point. One should not confuse self enforcement based on
reciprocal threats of retaliation with unilateral imposition based on
coercion. A state that surrenders to superior force is not behaving
cooperatively, but rather demonstrating a preference for survival or
distaste for discomfort.8 9 Coercion signals no reliable information about
either the durability of the coercing party's preferences or the credibility
of the coerced party's promises, except that it suggests an inability to
cooperate reciprocally on the part of both. If one interprets the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact not as a mutual commitment to refrain from
aggression, but rather as a unilateral obligation by the Soviet Union not
to take precautions against Germany, then the pact teaches very little
about self enforcement.
Similarly, we would not regard
Czechoslovakia's acceptance of its absorption into Germany through the
Anschluss as reflecting compliance with an international agreement,
because only in a formal and meaningless sense of the word did
Czechoslovakia agree to become part of Germany. 9°
1918-1945, supra, at 166; Declaration of September 28, 1939, by the Government of
the German Reich and the Government of the USSR, Sept. 28, 1939, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R.,
translated in 8 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1918-1945, supra, at 167;

Supplementary Protocol Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Oct. 4, 1939, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., translated in 8 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN

POLICY: 1918-1945, supra, at 208-12.
89.
For development of the point, see Goldsmith & Posner, Theory, supra note
5, at 1123-24.
90.
Consider the following finding of the Nuremberg Tribunal:
On the 14th March, 1939 the Czech President Hacha and his Foreign
Minister Chvalkovsky came to Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler and attended
a meeting at which the defendants Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel were
present, with others. The proposal was made to Hacha that if he would sign
an agreement consenting to the incorporation of the Czech people in the
German Reich at once, Bohemia and Moravia would be saved from
destruction. He was informed that German troops had already received
orders to march and that any resistance would be broken with physical force.
The defendant Goering added the threat that he would destroy Prague
completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful alternative, Hacha and his
Foreign Minister put their signatures to the necessary agreement at 4.30 in
the morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on behalf of Germany.
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Trade agreements offer another example of self enforcement
through retaliatory threats. A state that lowers its tariffs or otherwise
reduces trade barriers gives up potential revenue and diminishes
protection desired by its producers to the benefit of exporting producers
based in other states. If one party defects, then the other may respond
symmetrically. As long as each party has a domestic market that other
parties covet, its threat to protect its market will encourage others not to
protect theirs. By "a market," of course, we mean not just the
immediate trade balance, but the discounted value of a series of
anticipated future interactions. 9
Sovereign indebtedness also illustrates the function of retaliatory
threats in international agreements. Throughout history and manifestly
today, sovereigns manage to acquire significant assets based only on
their promise to repay the debt, in spite of the capacity of many to
repudiate their debts unilaterally or to degrade them through currency
manipulation.92 What most powerfully explains the willingness of
lenders to treat these promises as credible is a conviction that
governments will seek private financing of public debt into the indefinite
future. Thus, although government default seems about as frequent an
occurrence as private failures to honor debts, typically lenders and states
negotiate rescheduling rather than invoking the coercive powers of third
parties. The defaulting state pays a penalty in terms of high interest
rates rather than by absorbing a lump-sum sanction. The exception to
this pattern reinforces the point: revolutionary regimes often declare a
break with the past, repudiate past obligations and initially pursue a
policy of financial autarky. Over time, these regimes seek to return to

Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War
Criminals 437-38 (Sept. 30, 1946).
Conversely, trade agreements also can illustrate nonreciprocity and
91.
coercion. A country that derives greater benefit from access to another country's
domestic market than it can offer to exporters from that country (again accounting for
future expectations) may not have a credible retaliatory threat. When the United States
in the early 1950s violated its obligation to the Netherlands to allow cheese imports, the
Netherlands did not retaliate in spite of an impartial finding that the United States had
infringed its rights under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Netherlands Action Article XXIII:2 to Suspend Obligztions to the Unitd States, Nov. 8,
1952 GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.), at 62 (1952). We can surmise that, at least at that
time, the Netherlands rationally believed that the United States did not regard the
discounted value of present and future access to the Netherlands market as sufficiently
valuable to induce any change in its actions. Put plainly, the United States could coerce
the Netherlands not to retaliate for its unilateral departure from its GATT obligations.
92.
See generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
WESTERN EUROPE (Oxford University Press 1993) (1984) (documenting the practice of
sovereign debt).
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the capital markets, and when they do so belatedly negotiate settlements
of their predecessors' obligations.9"
Credible and reciprocal threats of direct retaliation explain much of
the enforceability of international agreements. First, a large portion of
extant international agreements are bilateral, and thus identify precisely
the persons who have an interest in inducing enforcement. Bilateral
agreements also are the type of accord most likely to produce substantial
internalization of the agreement's benefits by the parties. Second, many
agreements seek to augment welfare through a mutual exchange of
concessions. Where the expectations underlying the agreement are
realized, withdrawing the concession would harm the other party.
At the same time, the prospect of party retaliation is insufficient to
maximize the value of all international agreements. First, a significant
number of agreements are multilateral, sometimes extensively, leading
to a free-rider problem. If retaliation is costly and the benefits of
adherence are shared by a large number of parties, then no one party
may have a sufficient incentive to bear the burden of retaliation.
Knowledge of this fact diminishes the threat value of retaliation. 9,
Second, some agreements generate benefits to persons besides the
parties. We should not expect any party to absorb costs to protect those
externalized benefits. And third, all agreements remain vulnerable to
the end-game problem. As state preferences change, due either to
exogenous events or a transformation of a political elite, one or more
parties may have less to lose from retaliation and thus become prone to
defection. Understanding this concept, all parties may underinvest in
compliance. 95 To the extent that we nonetheless observe some
enforcement of such agreements, we need to consider complementary
self-enforcing mechanisms.

93.

See PAUL

B.

STEPHAN Er AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND EcONOMICS-

624-36 (3d ed. 2004) [STEPHAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS];
Guzman, Compliance-BasedTheory, supra note 13, at 1854.
94.
For a discussion of the incentives created by breaches of multilateral
treaties, see Setear, Responses, supra note 15, at 33-38.
95.
Scott, Long-Term Contracts,supra note 16, at 2033.
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2.

REPUTATION IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Reputation is an additional mechanism for self-enforcing
international agreements. As we observed in Part I, there exists
extensive documentation of the effectiveness of community-based
sanctions as a means of inducing the compliance of individuals with an
obligation. 96 This dynamic applies to states as well. 9' A reputation for
honoring commitments benefits a state by increasing the possibilities of
future beneficial cooperation. Monitoring compliance need not be costly
(although the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact provides a counterexample) and
information about compliance, if verifiable, may be easy to share among
states. The set of potential future parties presumably is larger than the
set of present parties to any particular international agreement, so more
states have an incentive both to acquire information about the behavior
of other states and to generate a positive reputation for international
probity.
In some instances reputational incentives can provide a better
explanation for compliance with international commitments than does
reciprocal retaliation. A state facing an end-game problem in one
agreement must understand that its behavior will affect its future
prospects for international cooperation through other agreements. Thus,
even if it wishes to dispose of its current relationship opportunistically,
it must consider how such opportunism will affect its future prospects.
Moreover, all potential states can make reputation-based responses to
another state's behavior, not just those with which they currently enjoy
formal treaty relations. A concern for its reputation thus will induce a
state to cooperate even in cases where it is indifferent to retaliation by
its counterparty.
Reputation, however, is not a complete explanation of international
behavior. One complication derives from our observation above that
reputations attach to regimes rather than to states. Because reputation
has value only to the extent it has an impact on a state's future
prospects, one must introduce a discount factor to reflect the present
significance of those prospects.
It seems reasonable to assume,
however, that discount factors vary among regimes. A state that has a
stable history and no significant internal or external threat should have a
regime that values future prospects nearly as much as present ones. The
96.
See discussion, supra note 12.
97.
See Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 13, at 1863 (analyzing
the economics of international reputation and arguing for its central role in explaining
adherence to international law). Other scholars have recognized the role of reputation

but contend that it has a more limited function than Guzman claims. See George W.
Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J.

LEGAL STUD. S95, S95-96 (2002); Goldsmith & Posner, International Agreements,
supra note 8, at 136-37.
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ruling elite in a state undergoing radical transformation with an
uncertain outcome, in contrast, should devalue all future payoffs,
including both the benefits and harms associated with its reputation.
To take an example from recent events, the reputational effects to
the United States and the United Kingdom resulting from the invasion of
Iraq are likely to be long-lasting, while the effects on the soon-to-depart
More generally,
Baathist regime probably were less significant.
disputes between foreign investors and host countries tend to arise
mostly after a regime-change, whether the product of a violent
revolution-as in America in 1776 and Russia in 1917-or due to more
ordinary domestic turmoil. 9
A second problem results from the difficulty of specifying the
elements of a regime's reputation for compliance with its international
obligations. Andrew Guzman, in the course of an extensive analysis of
the role of reputation in explaining compliance, suggests that a state's
reputation may be both compartmentalized and dependent on the
character of the international obligation at issue. Guzman hypothesizes,
for example, that violations of an arms-control treaty may not affect how
others perceive a state's propensity to honor trade agreements, and that
dishonoring "soft law" obligations may count for. less than transgressing
a commitment that is explicitly legally binding."
We agree that a state's reputation for complying with international
obligations, and hence the role of reputation as a self-enforcement
mechanism, may not be monolithic or linear. We are skeptical,
however, about Guzman's particular conjectures. Guzman comes close
to arguing that reputational effects vary precisely with the scope and
content of the specific international obligation at issue. This position
collapses the question of the reputational effects and formal
international-law doctrine in a way that assumes that international-law
experts are the only relevant audience. We suspect that reputations can
vary in ways that do not coincide with formal compliance with
international-law obligations. To take a concrete example, the effect on
Japan's reputation due to its treatment of its prisoners during World War
II depended not at all on the fact that Japan did not join the 1929 Geneva
Convention."°°
This issue exposes a third complexity. If reputations are messy and
the impact of particular actions on them is unclear, then the significance
of reputation as a constraint on behavior comes into question. Once one
disposes of the extremes of outlaw recklessness and obsessive
punctiliousness, more finely grained assessments of reputation become
98.
Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-83 (1981) (reviewing
history of investment disputes between United States and new regimes).
99.
Guzman, Compliance-BasedTheory, supra note 13, at 1879, 1880-83.
100. See discussion, supra note 87.
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problematic. What should one make, for example, of the decision of the
United States in 1985 to withdraw its submission to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice? One prominent scholar
described this as a "wanton act,"' ' although the United States had
scrupulously complied with its obligations regarding the International
Court's jurisdiction. Did the United States encounter greater costs in its
international negotiations after that date? The growth of the United
States's multilateral activity afterwards, and particularly the building of
the coalition that fought the first Gulf War, suggests not.
A device that can clarify the connection between action and
reputation is a third-party dispute resolution system.1 °2 The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and its successor, the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), provide important instances of an
international agreement specifying a self-contained process to declare
compliance and violations. Only parties to the agreement (that is, states)
can invoke the process, and the dispute settlement body has no coercive
powers beyond a capacity to declare whether actions do or do not
comply with the agreement.' 3 The agreement thus uses dispute
settlement to generate specific information about compliance without
expending resources to coerce behavior.' 0
But even self-contained dispute resolution has its limits. First, the
quality of the information about members that it generates rests largely
on the dispute resolution body's reputation for accurate and disinterested
assessments. It seems unrealistic to take the latter for granted. Second,
we doubt that observers systematically separate information based upon
dispute-settlement determinations from other information about how
states respond to compliance determinations. Evidence of indifference
101. Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1445, 1445 (1985).
102. See generally Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A Theory of International
Adjudication (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Law Sch., Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 146, Univ. of Chic. John M. Olin L. & Econ.
Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 206, 2004) (exploring role of third-party
adjudicators as generating information about both the meaning of and compliance with
international agreements).
103. On GATT and WTO dispute settlement, see generally ANDREW GUZMAN,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT IN THE WTO (Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley Law Sch., Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 98, 2002); Andrew Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S205 (2002); Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and
the World Trade Organization, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49 (2000). Strictly speaking, the
WTO dispute-settlement body has the authority to determine the legality of both
complained-of conduct and proposed retaliation by a complaining party. It cannot award
damages or authorize independent, that is, nonretaliatory, sanctions.
104. For a more extensive discussion of formal dispute resolution based on selfenforcing agreements, see generally Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 6.
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to the resolution of a dispute, as manifested both by a failure of
noncompliers to alter their behavior and the absence of significant
retaliation, would undermine the reputational impact of those
Third, as discussed above, not all issues of
determinations. "'
importance to contracting states are verifiable at an acceptable cost. As
to nonverifiable issues, any pronouncements the dispute-settlement
system might make would be unhelpful.
As with retaliatory threats, reputation provides an important but
incomplete explanation of successful self enforcement of international
agreements. In particular, reputation does not provide a satisfactory
account of the behavior of either new or soon-to-depart regimes or of
the transitivity of reputation across international agreements. These
lacunae might suggest that self enforcement has serious limits as a
positive theory to explain compliance with international agreements.
There remains to be considered, however, whether states may have a
preference for compliance that is independent of retaliatory threats and
reputation.
3.

RECIPROCAL FAIRNESS AS A STATE PREFERENCE

Laboratory studies provide substantial evidence of the existence of
a preference for reciprocal fairness on the part of many, but by no
means all, individuals. 0 6 To what extent does a preference for
reciprocal fairness extend to states? We argue that the individual
characteristics identified by the laboratory studies may also extend to
regime-preference formation. Our argument rests on both inferences
about regimes and some casual empiricism.
Regimes comprise individuals, so it is plausible that those people
who shape a regime's preferences have something in common with the
persons studied in the laboratory experiments. We suspect, however,
that the representativeness problem that underlies all experimental data
may have special salience when the group of interest-elite decisionmakers responsible for conducting foreign policy-is atypical of the
general population. We therefore do not insist on the relevance of the
experimental data, other than as suggesting a line of investigation.
It may be that elites must take into account a widely held preference
in the general population for reciprocal fairness, even if elite members
do not share this preference, due to democratic constraints on elite
conduct. We doubt this argument has much purchase. First, a
significant number of regimes face reduced or nonexistent democratic
105. For a preliminary but significant inquiry into the relationship between an
international tribunal's structure and compliance with its decisions, see Posner & Yoo,
supra note 102, at 17-25.
106. See discussion, supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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constraints. Some have no democratic elections; others, such as the
members of the European Union, delegate significant discretion
regarding international relations to supranational institutions. Second,
we suspect that national foreign-policy elites will have considerable
capacity to mediate accounts of their international behavior with national
electorates. Depictions of reciprocal fairness to some extent may
substitute for actual conduct.
Notwithstanding these reservations, there are still good reasons to
believe that many regimes exhibit a preference for reciprocal fairness.
First, states typically carry out international relations through
bureaucracies. Ministries of foreign affairs, trade, and the armed forces
shape policy in the overwhelming majority of states.
These
bureaucracies might plausibly display the tendency generally observed in
such structures, namely, ceteris paribus, maximization of discretionary
authority.' 7 And exhibiting reciprocal fairness seems a good strategy
for optimizing interactions with counterpart bureaucracies, which in turn
should maximize each bureaucracy's power vis-A-vis its political
masters.
A response to this conjecture might be that tension rather than
cooperation may optimize bureaucratic power. Military bureaucracies
in particular might increase their authority by minimizing interactions
with their counterparts as part of a broader strategy of stoking tensions
and feeding insecurity. One strand of late twentieth-century thought, for
example, maintained that a U.S. national security complex fattened its
budgets and expanded its influence by contriving a permanent sense of
crisis. 108

On balance, however, this response seems far-fetched. By and
large, uncooperative behavior that fuels international tension creates
disproportionately greater risks for foreign policy elites. A crisis brings
their performance under more scrutiny than usual, may set in motion
dangerous events with consequences beyond the elite's control, and
otherwise unsettles the stable rationality that bureaucracies generally
seek. We suspect that the link between conventional bureaucratic
incentives and reciprocal fairness is strong, although by no means
absolute.
Anecdotal evidence shows that even military bureaucracies exhibit
some preference for reciprocal fairness including the use of confidence107.
See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS
31-42 (1994); MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 39

(A. M. Henderson & Talcont Parsons trans., 1947); William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats
and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 618-23 (1985).

108. See generally GAR ALPEROVITZ, ATOMIC DIPLOMACY: HIROSHIMA AND
POTSDAM: THE USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE AMERICAN CONFRONTATION WITH
SOVIET POWER (1985); NOAM CHOMSKY, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL: AMERICA'S QUEST
FOR GLOBAL DOMINANCE (2003).
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building measures to which states commit themselves. The Treaty on
exemplifies such
in Europe
Conventional Armed Forces
09
One might think that professional military
arrangements. 1
organizations would oppose an agreement that constrains weapons
deployments and the size of deployed forces. But the treaty has
substantial reporting and inspection requirements and rests on
confidence-building measures such as embedded observers that earlier
These techniques engage military
agreements had promoted." °
personnel in a range of cooperative behaviors with their counterparts,
interactions that those involved seem to find desirable.
A further suggestion of preferences for reciprocal fairness among
many states can be inferred from the growth in number, scale, and scope
of international organizations devoted to facilitating cooperative
behavior. Growth may reflect many factors, of course, but it seems
reasonable to associate an organization's reputation, which accumulates
over time, with increased attractiveness to regimes already disposed to
reciprocal fairness. To cite some important but by no means exclusive
examples of growth, the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank had 29 members in 1946, 173 in 1992, and 184 in 2003;"' GATT
had 23 founding members in 1947, 102 in 1979, and its successor, the
WTO, had 146 in 2003;' 12 the (then) European Communities had 6
founding members in 1957, and, as the European Union, grew to 15 in
1994 and 25 in 2004. "' Each of these institutions also evolved from a
specific-purpose entity, such as postwar reconstruction, currency
stability, tariff reduction, to a much broader governance institution. We
recognize that these organizations may stand for less than they seem.114
But even discounting for the gap between the ambitions and the
accomplishments of these organizations, their proliferation suggests that
109. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, S.
Doc. No. 102-8 (1991). See generally S.V. Kortunov, Basic Principles of
Reduction and Limitation of Conventional Forces, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TREATY

AND
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POLITICAL

DIMENSIONS:

A

U.S.-SovIET

DIALOGUE 186 (Paul B. Stephan III & Boris M. Klimenko eds., 1991) (providing

analysis of this treaty and its implications by a leading Soviet expert).
110.

See
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COMPLIANCE

WITH
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HANDLER

CHAYES,
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THE
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147

(1995).
111.

IMF,

IMF

at

a

Glance:

A

Factsheet,

available

at

http:l/www.imf.orglexternallnplexrlfacts/glance.htm(last visited Aug. 15, 2004).
112. See generally WTO INFORMATION AND MEDIA RELATIONS DIVISION,
at
available
2003),
ed.
(3d
WTO
THE
UNDERSTANDING
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif e/utw-chapl-e.pdf.
Union, available at
Europa, The History of the European
113.
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/index-en.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2004).
114. For expression of this skepticism, see Stephan, Accountability, supra note
83, at 729-34.
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an increasing number of regimes prefer the kind of reciprocal and
cooperative relations that membership in the organizations promotes.
4.

SELF-ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACT
THEORY

As we observed above, self enforcement is the norm in
international agreements. Before exploring departures from this norm,
we consider whether the patterns in self-enforcing international
agreements conform to the predictions of the rational-reciprocity
approach. Many of these agreements involve fairly simple and clear
commitments, either as stated or as a result of the dispute-resolution
process contained in the agreement. At least as importantly, they
typically implicate observable but unverifiable conditions, such as
perceptions of national security or serious injury to economic interests.
Moreover, many agreements provide the parties with ongoing
opportunities to signal a preference for reciprocity.
Consider first the broad class of arms-control agreements. By
forgoing technologically feasible procurement in instances where
research, development, and deployment take time, a party to these
agreements exposes itself to the risk of opportunistic behavior by others.
Increasing the credibility of a promise not to acquire a weapons system
clearly would enhance the promisor's expected return. At the same
time, each promise carries an implicit reservation, namely that its
adherence will not come at the price of destruction of the regime. The
modem trend in these agreements has been toward increasingly
elaborate inspection and verification, sometimes carried out by
independent monitors, as in the case of the ultimately unsuccessful UN
arms inspections in Iraq between 1991 and 2003 and the various
interventions of the International Atomic Energy Commission from
Chernobyl in 1986 to Iran in 2004. Thus, although no arms-control
agreement of which we are aware employs formal, quasi-judicial thirdparty coercive enforcement, they do provide some space for noncoercive
third-party dispute resolution."'
We believe the reasons why arms-control regimes rely solely on
self enforcement are reasonably clear and are consistent with contract
theory. Parties have an incentive not only to make their commitments to
arms-control credible so as to induce reliance in others but also require
sufficient flexibility to abandon their commitments when grave security
interests arise. To a greater extent than other kinds of international
agreements, the subject of arms control involves regime security.
Moreover, regimes plausibly do not regard the question of whether any
115.

See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 110, at 179-83.
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state of affairs threatens its security as verifiable. Rather, regimes
should regard the calculus as to what constitutes an unacceptable threat
to their survival as uniquely nondelegable. At the same time, regime
security seems reasonably observable. As a result, we should expect
for
regimes to strive to enhance clarity and augment opportunities
6
reciprocal action. Observers report that this is the case."
A much-studied example of a self-enforcing international agreement
is the Uruguay Round Agreements and the WTO that administers
them." 7 Like arms-control agreements, enhancing the credibility of the
respective promises augments the value of trade commitments. Also
like arms-control agreements, these agreements implicate fundamental
issues of regime security, although of an economic rather than a military
nature. Finally, and to a much greater extent than in arms control, the
formalization and elaboration of noncoercive third-party dispute
resolution has grown over time. The early GATT, ancestor of the
Uruguay Round Agreements, contained no formal procedure as such,
although one based on arbitration buttressed by self enforcement evolved
to meet the needs of the parties. A 1979 Understanding formalized
these customary practices." 8 The 1994 version involves greater
institutional development, including the creation of a standing appellate
body and strengthening of the statement of obligation associated with its
determinations. But, as noted above, the WTO retains the fundamental
structure of self enforcement. Only states that are parties to the
Uruguay Round Agreements can invoke the dispute-resolution process,
and they may raise only their own economic injuries. The disputeresolution process informs the complainant what levels of retaliation
would be proper under those agreements but does not itself impose any
sanctions. Violations result in party retaliation and reputation effects but
not third-party coercion." 9
116.
117.

See id. at 189-96.
Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,

1994, LEGAL TEXTS-RESuLTS OF THE URUGUAY
NEGOTIATIONS 9, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994)

ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE

118. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement
and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, 26 B.I.S.D., at 200 (1979), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/tokyo-notife.pdf.
119. See generally Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,

UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING
ANNEX 2, 33 I.L.M. 353 (1994), available at

THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES,

http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal e/28-dsu.pdf. For discussion, see Ginsburg &
McAdams, supra note 6, at 7-8; Guzman & Simmons, supra note 103, at S205-08;
Posner & Yoo, supra note 102, at 38-39. Guzman, working from the premise that
WTO dispute resolution generates positive externalities in terms of greater regime clarity
and deterrence of noncompliance that produces general harms, argues that coercive
powers should be added to the system to induce greater resort to the dispute resolution
process. Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to
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Although the link between moral clarity and self enforcement seems
evident in the case of WTO dispute settlement, one particular trend is
noteworthy. During the initial phase of the GAT" system, from its
1947 creation until the 1979 changes embodied in the Tokyo Round
Agreements, the obligations largely dealt with tariff reduction and
comparable straightforward and determinable commitments. Observers
documented high compliance and relatively infrequent resort to formal
dispute resolution. Beginning with the Tokyo Round, and particularly
with the 1994 Uruguay Round, the agreements extended to considerably
more complex and interdependent commitments, especially reduction in
nontariff trade barriers such as health and safety regulation. As the
nature of the obligations have lost their clarity, reported violations have
increased, arguably at a greater rate than under GATT, and we have
seen a higher incidence of formal dispute resolution, more frequent
refusal to end practices found to be inconsistent with WTO obligations,
and greater criticism of the process by trade experts." 0
We offer these examples as representative of the kinds of self
enforcement that pervades the field of international agreements. There
may well be instances where self-enforcing international agreements lack
clarity or rest on verifiable criteria, but these also tend to be cases where
the importance of investments and the corresponding need to enhance
promisor credibility is slight.' 2 ' A real test of the relevance of the
Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 320-26 (2002).
This argument ignores both the possibility that many Uruguay Round obligations may
present verification issues and, more importantly, the possibility that coercive
enforcement may crowd out self enforcement.
120. Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The WTO Impact on Internal
Regulations-A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs 283, 283-87 (Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2001); Posner & Yoo, supra note 102, at 39-44; Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic
Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3
CHI. J. INT'L L. 353, 355-56 (2002) (discussing technical barriers to trade and WTO
dispute resolution process); Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global
Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 494 & n.57 (2000) (citing disputes over
Cuba sanctions, meat hormones, preferences for former colonies, and dolphin
protection).
121.
Characteristic of this class of agreements are nonreciprocal commitments
by states to respect the human rights of their own subjects. These agreements have
considerable moral attraction, but they do not involve the reliance by one state on the
commitment of others. As Goldsmith and Posner have observed, "absent special
circumstances like the minority rights situation, a nation otherwise inclined to abuse its
citizens gains nothing from declining to do so in return for a reciprocal commitment
from another nation to do the same." Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary
InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 669 (2000) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner,
Understanding]; see also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) (characterizing
human rights conventions as not based on reciprocity and exchange).
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contract theory approach must come from a study of international
agreements that go beyond self enforcement and incorporate some form
of third-party coercion.
B.

Coercive Third-PartyEnforcement

With respect to private parties, coercive third-party enforcement
entails the state, or some comparable higher authority, threatening
sanctions against defaulters. As to international agreements, third-party
coercion seems problematic because there are no international entities
capable of carrying out threats against those who dishonor the precepts
of international law. As we will show, however, some enforcement
mechanisms associated with international agreements do correspond to
those underlying private contracts.
1.

THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION

Coercive third-party enforcement of international agreements has
three critical elements. First, affected private parties, and not just states
that sign an agreement, have the right to pursue violations. Second, a
disinterested third party has the jurisdiction to consider the claim.
Third, the third party has the authority and capacity to impose
substantial sanctions directly on a violating state. 122
We recognize that isolating these characteristics as coercive implies
a commitment to a particular theory of regime motivation. We will not
unpack all of the implications of this commitment here, but we note
several salient points. First, extending to private parties the capacity to
invoke a tribunal's jurisdiction solves an agency problem that otherwise
might lead to underutilization of the forum. A person affected by
regime action-perhaps an investor injured by a regulatory decision of
the host state-has a direct interest in obtaining redress. The regime
administering the injured person's state might act on his behalf, but it
also will take into account other aspects of its relationship with the
122. Our conception of coercive third-party enforcement corresponds in part to
what some call transnational dispute resolution. See Robert Keohane et al., Legalized
Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT'L ORG. 457, 468-69 (2000).
Unlike Keohane's and his coauthors' definition, however, we focus not on the

independence of the adjudicatory body, which in the case of investment arbitration is
quite limited, at least using the criteria advanced by Posner and Yoo but on its coercive
capabilities. Posner & Yoo, supra note 102. To take an example discussed by Posner
and Yoo, but not by Keohane and his coauthors, the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal has great

coercive authority due to the fact that it presides over a large sum of money, which can
be disbursed only pursuant to its decisions, but the body's jurisdiction is limited to the ex
post resolution of a particular set of disputes, thereby limiting its independence. See id.

at 30-3 1.

600

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

injuring regime and may fail to prosecute the claim because of
extraneous considerations. 23 Private-party standing thus increases the
against the interests of a regime bound
likelihood that a tribunal will act
124
by an international agreement.
Second, when it comes to tribunals, disinterested does not
International agreements sometimes
necessarily mean independent.
constitute tribunals in a manner that forces them to compete for business
and therefore provides incentives for reaching outcomes that the
disputants will regard as desirable. Such bodies differ from permanent
tribunals that have mandatory jurisdiction over a set of disputes that can
be resolved in ways that reflect the normative preferences of the tribunal
members. 25 Disinterestedness requires only that the decision-makers
will not allow extraneous considerations such as bribes or threats to
influence their decision once they acquire jurisdiction over a dispute.
Third, we assume that direct sanctions imposed by a tribunal have
greater salience than the reputational costs that an adjudicatory body can
inflict simply by declaring one side is wrong. Regimes might balance
reputational and financial interests differently than would a private
person, and in particular, might respond to monetary sanctions in a

123. A well-known example of an agency problem leading to nonutilization of a
tribunal is Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 25-26 (4th Cir. 1961). Plaintiff
sued an entity belonging to Venezuela in a commercial dispute. Under U.S. law at that
time, federal court jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign entity required the consent of
the U.S. government, and the State Department had announced that it automatically
would consent to suits based on commercial activity. In this particular case, however,
the State Department blocked the suit, evidently as compensation to Venezuela for its
cooperation in resolving an airline-hijacking dispute.
124. We note that the absence of private enforcement also excludes international
tribunals responsible for the prosecution of war crimes and similar international
offenses. These bodies have coercive authority as long as any one national state is
willing to imprison those convicted by these tribunals. We, nevertheless, omit them
from our discussion, largely because of doubts about the general significance of
Most of the tribunals for the
international agreements creating these tribunals.
prosecution of war crimes involved post-hoc responses to conflicts that had ended, based
on the Nuremberg model. See Scott Luftglass, Note, Crossroads in Cambodia: The
United Nations' Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the Establishment of a
Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893, 927-33
(2004). The only exception, the International Criminal Court based on the 1998 Rome
Statute, has yet to hear a case and, we suspect, is unlikely ever to acquire a substantial
docket. In particular, we embrace the predictions of Posner and Yoo, predicting that
side agreements reached by peacekeeping countries, such as those already reached by the
United States, will prevent the International Criminal Court from doing much real work.
Posner & Yoo, supra note 102, at 60-61.
125. Posner & Yoo, supra note 102, at 23. For further discussion of the
distinction between dispute-resolution and expressive functions of tribunals, including
those applying international law, see Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty-U.S.
Litigation in the Mirror of InternationalLaw, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 627, 639-45 (2002).
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more complex fashion. 2 6 But the power to apply these sanctions
nevertheless implies an independent capacity to affect the behavior of
parties to a dispute and augments the reputational effects of a tribunal's
decision by reinforcing its consequential significance.
A wide range of international agreements specify a third-party
dispute-resolution mechanism, but not many of these meet our definition
of coercive. 27 Even the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a zenith of
international cynicism and futility masked as law, contained an
arbitration clause. The GATT and WTO dispute-resolution process in
particular has evolved into a formalized, institutionally well-developed
and academically well-studied system. As we have observed, however,
what lies behind all these treaty-based dispute-resolution mechanisms is
a dynamic of state self enforcement.' 2 Under these agreements, only
states may seek dispute resolution, and the entity designated by the
agreements as the dispute resolver-the WTO dispute-resolution body in
the case of the WTO, the International Court in the case of other
instruments, or ad hoc arbitration as in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pacthas only the authority to declare the legal rights and obligations of the
parties, and not to impose any sanctions. None of these disputesettlement mechanisms, however formalized, employs coercion as a
means of inducing compliance.
But an increasing number of international agreements do invoke
coercive sanctions through binding arbitration. Some involve ad hoc
dispute resolution rather than permanent international tribunals; some do
use such tribunals, and some employ independent domestic courts as
enforcers.

126.

See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the

Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 416-20 (2000).

127. For a survey of the practice that does not distinguish between coercive and
noncoercive third-party adjudication, see generally Posner & Yoo, supra note 102.
128. Some might argue that the WTO dispute-resolution process in particular
presents a complex case because WTO adjudicators have the capacity to authorize
retaliatory actions by aggrieved states against countries that violate various Uruguay
Round Agreements. But the WTO does nothing more than provide an opinion as to
what retaliation would conform to its understanding of international law; the decision to
retaliate remains that of the aggrieved state. At bottom, even sanctions generated by the
WTO are reputational rather than direct and substantial.
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2.

AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE

Unlike the traditional dispute-resolution mechanism, this arbitration
occurs at the invocation of private persons and can result in binding
financial awards that a defaulting state must pay more or less
automatically. Giving private persons the right to pursue a claim
increases the strength of a state's promise and solves the agency cost
problem that otherwise results because states do not have the same
incentives to protect investment-exporting citizens as do the investors
themselves. Accordingly, recognition of private standing strengthens
the value of the host country's commitment to protect investor rights by
increasing the expected cost of sanctions. The ultimate enforceability of
an arbitral award through international attachment, as well as the
existence of reliable mechanisms in some countries, such as the United
States, for independent judicial enforcement,
makes the outcome of
29
these arbitrations material and direct.
Historically, arbitration tribunals represented a post hoc response to
a dispute. Once a controversy arose, the countries involved agreed to
let injured persons submit their claims and provided some mechanism
for domestic enforcement of the tribunal's decisions. An especially
powerful example of this mechanism is the United States-Iran Claims
Tribunal. This body, still at work more than two decades after its
creation as a mechanism for resolving a standoff between the two
countries, exercises its authority to dispense awards out of a fund
created from Iranian assets located in the United States. The existence
of the several billions of dollars of Iranian property under U.S. control,
as much as the formal agreement establishing the tribunal, explains that
body's successful record as an arbiter of claims by U.S. and Iranian
persons. '
Since World War II, and particularly in the last two decades,
capital-exporting states have entered into agreements that provide ex
ante for coercive enforcement of disputes over the treatment of foreign
investors. The details of these investor protection agreements vary, and
our knowledge of practice under them is incomplete because of a waning
tradition of treating both the agreements and outcomes as confidential. 31
For a brief discussion of the role of damages in investment treaties, see
supra note 8, at 52-54. Guzman does not
investigate damages as an enforcement mechanism under either European supranational
law or through domestic courts. See generally id.
129.

GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS,

130.

For the background of the tribunal's creation, see Dames & Moore, 453

For a review of its practice, see CHARLES N.
BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1998).
U.S. at 662-66.

BROWER & JASON D.

131.
For discussion of this tradition and its waning, see Dep't of Econ. Pol'y
and Dev. of the City of Moscow v. Bankers Trust Co., [2004] E.W.C.A. Civ. 314
(C.A. 2004).
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In general, however, a host country commits in advance to resolve
disputes stemming from a private investment through third-party
arbitration, either invoking the World Bank's International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") auspices or through some
other institution. The investor can invoke the procedure without seeking
any government's permission and can translate their victories into
monetary payment through the normal judicial process, which
3 2 at least in
some countries operates independently of the government.
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") is an especially powerful example of ex ante creation of a
coercive third-party mechanism for resolving investment disputes.' 33 Its
provisions codify certain substantive protections for investors and
authorize complainants to invoke the auspices of third-party arbitration
against the three state parties. To date, aggrieved investors have
brought thirty-three claims against Canada, Mexico, and the United
States. 1" 4 In each case, the ICSID established a panel of arbiters
empowered to issue a monetary award. Prevailing claimants enforce
their awards through the normal judgment collection procedures
available in national courts.' 35

132. For a list of those disputes arbitrated under ICSID auspices that have been
made public, along with some opinions, see World Bank Group, ICSID Cases, at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2004). For a
more general discussion of bilateral investment treaties, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Investment Agreements and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 12529 (2003); and Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 65158 (1997).
133. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M.
605, 644. For further discussion of this provision, see Frederick M. Abbott, The
Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the
Boundaries of North American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303,
303-09 (1999); Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The
Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRASNAT'L L. 43, 51-60 (2001); Todd Weiler,
NAFTA Article 1105 and the Principles of InternationalEconomic Law, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 67-70 (2003).
134. As of November 15, 2003, nine claimants have initiated arbitration against
Canada, fourteen claimants against Mexico, and ten claimants against the United States.
See Todd Weiler, NAFTALAW.ORG, at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Aug.
15, 2004).
135. For further discussion, see generally Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts,
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675
(2002); Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (2003); Charles H. Brower,
II, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
37 (2003); Paul B. Stephan, Redistributive Litigation-Judicial Innovation, Private
Expectations, and the Shadow of International Law, 88 VA. L. REv. 789 (2002)
[hereinafter Stephan, Redistributive Litigation].
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NAFTA also contains another, less typical instance of coercive
third-party arbitration of an international agreement. NAFTfA's Chapter
19 allows private persons to challenge government decisions to impose
antidumping and countervailing duties.136

Special arbitration panels

substitute for the judicial review of administrative decision-making that
normally would take place. These panels do not have the authority to
impose coercive measures against a state, but each of the NAFTA
parties has enacted a domestic law making the government's collection
of antidumping and countervailing duties contingent on its successful
conclusion of the Chapter 19 process.'37
One might argue that the types of arbitration arrangements we
describe here are not substantially different from the state-to-state
dispute-settlement procedures exemplified by the WTO system. In
either case, a state might refuse to honor its obligations. In the instance
of WTO dispute resolution, a state might not bring itself into conformity
with what the WTO dispute settlement body specifies as its obligations,
taking its chances with retaliation by other WTO members. In the case
of arbitration, a state might not honor an award, either by directing a
court to disregard the arbitral outcome or by enacting a law that blocks
payment. This argument, however, assumes that inducing a court to set
aside an arbitral award or the legislature to block payment entails only
insignificant costs. The assumption may be valid as to authoritarian
regimes operating without effective separation of powers. But for many
states, especially those in the rich world, judicial and parliamentary
independence are relatively stable and robust features of the domestic
government. For regimes managing the foreign policy of these states, a
refusal to honor a third-party arbitral award entails domestic as well as
external costs. From the perspective of such a regime, the decision of a
third-party arbiter may function essentially the same as a command of a
domestic court.
Why do states enter into these commitments? The rationalreciprocity approach provides an explanation. First, these agreements
have at their core complex, relation-specific investments where the
welfare gains from making credible promises are significant. Absent
protection from host-government overreaching, investors either will
make lesser investments or demand greater compensation from their
hosts. Second, the commitments contained in these agreements refer to
conditions that are likely to be verifiable and they do not contain implicit
reservations resting on nonverifiable conditions.
The events that
constitute compensable violations of investment protection agreements
involve public acts with reasonably determinable economic
136.

North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 19, 32 I.L.M.

605,681.

137.

See Bradley, supra note 18, at 1775.
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consequences. And allowing foreign investors to develop an oil field or
build a pipeline is much less likely to threaten a regime's security than is
losing an arms race or allowing imports to destroy an entrenched local
industry. Third, the persons to whom the host state's promises are
directed-foreign investors-have an intense and focused interest in
having the obligation honored, while their home state, which in form is
the promisee, may have a more complicated set of incentives and might
sell out the investors in pursuit of some other objective. Coercive
enforcement at the behest of the investors, without mediation by the
home state, thus solves an agency-cost problem. Finally, the prospect
of externally coerced compensation responds to the regime-change endgame problem that historically has undermined self-enforcing
commitments to foreign investors. 3 '
3.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND EMBEDDED DISPUTE RESOLUTION

In terms of substantive obligation, the basic economic commitments
that make up the Treaty of Rome, the constitutional basis of the
European Community, and the norms embraced in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which extends to the European Community members and
twenty of their neighbors, do not differ greatly from those contained in
more broadly based multilateral agreements such as the Uruguay Round
Agreements and the various UN human rights conventions. 39 Unlike
these multilateral regimes, however, the two European agreements each
establish an independent court with the authority to hear complaints
brought by private persons and to levy fines on states that default on
their commitments. Why have the Europeans departed from the selfenforcing mechanisms used elsewhere?
We believe the answer involves the embedding of the courts within
the European commitment to the elimination of trade barriers and the
protection of fundamental personal rights. In Europe, these policies are
not ends in themselves, but rather means of realizing a broader project.
The Treaty of Rome and the European Convention and the courts they
establish are part of an integrated and ambitious effort to replace the
national structures that proved so unsatisfactory for much of the
twentieth century with a European-wide federal state.
138. The existence of this enforcement mechanism suggests it provides some
value but not necessarily that it is optimal. For evidence that domestic judicial
enforcement of claims against the state has a salient role in encouraging investment, see
discussion, supra note 51.
139. See generally THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000); Joel P. Trachtman, The
Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the InternationalEconomic Organization:Toward
ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 470 (1997).
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Some historical perspective is necessary to appreciate this point.
The identity of states is contingent and in flux, even if not to the same
In 1783, thirteen independent, cooperating
degree as regimes.
the Atlantic coast of North America; by
existed
along
sovereignties
During the midstates
had become one.
1789, the cooperating
and
the like became
principalities
nineteenth century, many kingdoms,
Reich
in the north.
and
the
German
Europe
State
in
southern
the Italian
Soviet
Union,
such
as
the
We recently have seen state decompositions,
Projects to integrate Latin America,
Yugoslavia, and Indonesia.
portions of the former Soviet empire, and various parts of the Pacific
Rim are under way, although none has gone nearly as far as the
European experiment.' 40 The phenomenon is sufficiently frequent,
however, for us to regard the current experiment in European state
building as representative of a potentially broader phenomenon.
As of 2004, twenty-five independent European states have
transferred significant policymaking and bureaucratic discretion to the
organs of the European Community and have proposed giving the
European Union a broader role in framing a common foreign and
defense policy. In particular, the European Court of Justice generates a
considerable body of interpretive law, which the courts of the members
of the European Union regard as having direct effect in their countries.
Meanwhile, the forty-five members of the Council of Europe, which
includes all the present and prospective EU members, have delegated to
special purpose institutions substantial authority to police their human
The Council of Europe's judicial body, the
rights performance.
European Court of Human Rights, has the authority to hear suits by
private persons and to fine states that have transgressed the European
Convention on Human Rights; some of the member states also have
incorporated this body of law directly into their legal systems. The
substantive human rights law applied by the European Court of Human
Rights comprises not only dignitary interests but also economic rights
such as protection against arbitrary seizures of property.
Although the process of building European institutions rests
ultimately on a series of treaties, it also seems clear that these
agreements constitute more than conventional international law. "' What

140. For one somewhat visionary discussion of regional integration by a
respected academic, see generally LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING
ECONOMIC BATTLE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA (1992).
141. Some even have proposed creating a new category of "supranational law"
to accommodate the European project. See generally RAOUL C. VAN CAENEGEM,
EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE: UNrrY AND DIVERSITY OVER Two

MILLENIA (2002). We regard categorization as not as important as an appreciation of
context. Because the effort to create a European state both has great potential and
remains highly contingent, particular instances of the construction of European law
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interests us about these two bodies of law is the way they enforce the
international commitments that lie at the heart of the European project.
It seems clear that the edicts of the two courts, as well as the legislation
generated by the EU's Council and Commission, have more authority
than conventional international arbitration as described above. The
fundamental distinction lies in the embeddedness of the EU and Council
of Europe judicial institutions. First, they come attached to a complex
set of commitments, from border administration to regulatory
harmonization to criminal justice standards. A state cannot abandon
these commitments selectively, but rather must lose the benefits of all if
it wants to avoid the costs of any. Second, the commitments fit into an
even larger process involving the gradual diminution of European states
and the construction of something like a single European state. The
outcome of this process remains uncertain and contested, but costs of
exclusion from the broader project serve as yet another deterrent to
defaulting on the agreements. At the same time, like conventional
international arbitration, the two courts have the authority to levy fines
licenses and other administrative new property
and dispose of valuable
42
derived from EC law. 1
The fact of embeddedness and the latent threat of exclusion from a
wide range of existing and future institutional arrangements are
important additional coercive elements in both EU and Council of
Europe law. They suggest a blurring of domestic and international law,
as the potential for state coercion seems practically indistinguishable
from national law. For the participants in the process of European
unification, state coercion surely is important.
The rational-reciprocity approach offers some explanations for the
decision to build coercive enforcement into the European project. The
ultimate goal of a unified Europe constitutes the investment that
demands credible promissory enforcement. The creation of a European
state presents the prospect of significant economic, political, and cultural
benefits. But gradual surrender of national sovereignty in favor of
European organs puts the regimes in each state at risk of opportunism by
the others and by the European organs themselves. Progress toward
unification presents a complex problem of reciprocal performance with
(whether EU or European Convention) are fraught with implications for the general
enterprise.
142. The European Community's Court of Justice in particular seems virtually
identical to a national court, given that its fines can be paid out of EC funds earmarked
for particular member states. Unlike arbitration, no second enforcement process through
national courts is necessary. For a discussion of enforcement of judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights, see generally THE EXECUTION OF STRASBOURG AND
GERMAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS IN THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Tom Barkhuysen
et al. eds., 1999); ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN
INDOMESTIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1983).
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many opportunities for confusion between defection and justified
retaliation. Expansion of the scope of the project, especially salient
when the number of states in the European Union has increased by two14 3
thirds, precludes preliminary agreements as a means of building trust.
At the same time, the vesting of lawmaking power in the EC
Commission and Council reduces problems of verifiability by providing
a political and bureaucratic process to specify challenging issues of
performance measurement in terms that judicial bodies can verify and
implement.
The arguments extend to the European human-rights regime, even
though in the abstract human-rights commitments normally do not
involve reciprocity or investment.'" Although no formal linkage exists
between the two European regimes, they function as strong
complements. In particular, the European Union has required adherence
to the human-rights regime as a precondition of candidacy for
membership.'45 The human rights commitments in the European
Conventions, especially those directed at building political openness,
accountability, and cultural tolerance, are seen as disarming some of the
historical pathologies that could make economic dislocations more
difficult to tolerate.
Those commitments directed at judicial
independence also expand the scale of independent coercive
enforcement. The human rights commitments, thus, can be seen not just
as an end in themselves, but rather as a means of bolstering the
investments contemplated by the European state-building project.'46
4.

DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT

In recent years, considerable attention has focused on the use of
domestic legal institutions, and particularly domestic courts, to enforce
international agreements. The European project, for example, has relied
143. See generally Bignami, supra note 24.
144. See Goldsmith & Posner, Understanding,supra note 121, at 666-68.
145. See PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 135-72 (2003) (discussing relation of human-rights law to EC laws).
146. We note that the proposed international bankruptcy court of the IMF, if it
had come into being, would have conformed to our description of an embedded tribunal.
For discussion of the proposal, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds
and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1318-19 (2002); Michael T. Hilgers,
Debtor-States and an International Bankruptcy Court: The IMF Creditor Problem, 4

CHI. J. INT'L L. 257, 257 (2003); William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt
Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 2003 Working
Paper Series in Bus., Econ., and Regulatory Law, Working Paper No. 387880, 2003).
The tribunal would have had power to order stays of domestic legal proceedings and

would have been embedded in the IMF, an institution with enormous influence within
the international financial system.

significant support.

But the proposal seems to have gathered no
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not only on international judicial institutions such as the European Court
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, but on
commitments by states to allow their domestic courts to enforce the
obligations contained in the Treaty of Rome and the European
Convention. In the case of the Treaty of Rome, the Court of Justice
early on determined both that domestic courts had the obligation of
applying EC law even when it conflicted with national legislation, and
that it has the final say in determining whether domestic courts were
carrying out this mission.147 In the case of the convention, states have
had greater freedom as to how to use their domestic courts, but the
United Kingdom's Human Rights Act instructing domestic courts to treat
the decisions of the Human Rights Court as authority is an important
example of how extensive domestic enforcement can be. 141
Domestic enforcement is not limited to the Treaty of Rome and the
European Human Rights Convention. Traditionally, many agreements,
The Warsaw
especially in private law, assume direct effect.
Convention, which governs contracts by international air carriers,
overrides local contract and tort law. The Hague Rules, which states
have implemented by enacting statutes, similarly governs contracts by
international sea carriers.' 49 The IMF's Articles of Agreement, adopted
at the end of World War II, supersedes national law as to the
enforceability of contracts involving an exchange of currencies.150 Other
examples abound.
The significance of domestic enforcement of international
agreements depends on the quality and independence of domestic
courts.' 5' In countries with a powerful judiciary that acts free of
147. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen 1963 E.C.R. 3 (Treaty of Rome provisions create rights that individuals can
directly enforce in domestic courts.); Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL 1964 E.C.R. 1141
(European Court of Justice has final authority to review application of treaty by domestic
court).
148. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). For a fuller discussion of this
Act, see generally GORDON ANTHONY,

UK PUBLIC LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW: THE

DYNAMICS OF LEGAL INTEGRATION (2002). For other states, see authorities cited supra
note 168.
149. For a review of the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Rules, see
Stephan, Futility, supra note 83, at 762-72.
150. See generally JOSEPH GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ORGANIZATION (1988); STEPHAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 93, at
345-58.
151. See Paul B. Stephan III, Revisiting the IncorporationDebate: The Role of
Domestic Political Structure, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 417, 417 (1991). For evidence that
U.S. courts exercise independence in the interpretation of treaty provisions and do not
necessarily defer to claims by the U.S. government, see, for example, Washington v.
Wash. State Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 674-85 (1979);
United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 33 (1978); Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968); McCulloch v. SociedadNacional de Marineros
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government control, the courts function as a significant coercive check
on the capacity of the government to renegotiate or repudiate
international agreements. In the United States, for example, courts
enjoy a tradition of independence, possess the power to enjoin
government officials as well as to award damages, and operate in a
culture of innovative judicial lawmaking. Their decisions, including
their choices about enforcing international agreements, remain subject to
legislative override, but even the power of Congress and the President to
adopt legislation overturning judicial decisions is limited to 1instances
52
that, in the eyes of the judiciary, do not violate the Constitution.
Some international agreements expressly disavow direct domestic
enforcement.' 53 Others expressly call for domestic judicial enforcement,
either by their own terms' or through implementing domestic laws. 55
Many of the agreements that expressly call for direct domestic
enforcement involve private commercial transactions where the parties
typically are strangers to each other and not likely to engage in repeat
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 11-12 (1963); Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 42-47
(1951); Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 38899 (1949); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 269-81 (1947); Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. 536, 559-60 (1884); Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d
647, 649 (Fed. Cir. 1994); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp.
1456, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); compare Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 99117 (1976) (preserving power of the President to negotiate treaties was an insufficient
justification for statutory default rule excluding noncitizens from civil service); with
United States v. Guy W Capps, Inc., 348 U.S. 296, 296-305 (1955) (upholding
acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence, leaving unresolved issue of the validity of
the U.S.-Canada trade agreement on which prosecution was based).
152. For the argument that some legislation limiting the power of U.S. courts to
enforce international agreements may violate the U.S. Constitution, specifically the
Supremacy Clause, see Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346 (1995) [hereinafter Henkin,
U.S. Ratification]; Carlos Manuel Visquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 716-17 (1995). But See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399,
442-56 (2000). Courts also have the power to give surprising glosses to old and
neglected statutes to justify assertions of power. The present authority of U.S. courts to
create and enforce the customary international law of human rights, for example, rests
on a 1980 rediscovery of a 1789 statute. See Sosa, 123 S. Ct. 2739 (providing a narrow
endorsement of the use of the statute).
153. See generally Case c-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999
E.C.R. 1-8395 (analyzing deliberate decision of Uruguay Round parties not to have
agreements directly enforceable).
154. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944,
60 Stat. 1401, 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11.
155. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading, Signed at Brussels, Aug. 25, 1924, 51. Stat. 233, 233, 120
L.N.T.S. 155.
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play.' 56 Typically the potential losses parties face have a high variance.
As a result, self enforcement is unlikely to be optimal.
There remain, however, a significant number of agreements where
the intention of the parties is unclear. Those situations force national
lawmakers, and in particular domestic courts, to articulate interpretive
strategies and to construct default rules to determine the domestic effect
of agreements that fail to address the issue.' 7 Courts and commentators
tend to approach defaults from one of two directions. The proactive
approach, as we shall term it, presumes the efficacy of domestic judicial
enforcement of international agreements and puts the burden of proof on
those arguing against intervention. It focuses only on capacity issues
such as verifiability, asking whether an agreement contains "sufficiently
determinate standards" on which courts can base their actions.158 The
bargaining approach, as we shall call it, instead asks whether the
agreement bargained for judicial enforcement. Implicit in the latter is a
recognition that agreements might contain a mix of verifiable and
nonverifiable conditions representing offsetting concessions, and that
enforcement of only some might upset the parties' expectations and
skew performance away from observable but nonverifiable conditions."'
Two recent cases illustrate how these approaches work. In Kappus
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' 6° the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia had to decide whether U.S. taxpayer residents in
Canada could offset all U.S. income-tax liability with Canadian taxes
paid on the same income or instead would have to pay some portion of
the U.S. taxes. Article XXIV of the 1980 Tax Treaty between the
United States and Cananda seemed to require a full credit.' 6' But
§ 59(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision enacted after the
treaty went into effect, capped the available U.S. credit at ninety
percent. 162 To complicate matters further, the United States and Canada
had entered into additional protocols to the treaty in 1995 and 1997,

156. For a review of international agreements involving private commercial
transactions, see Stephan, Futility, supra note 83, at 762-63.
157. The controversial instances involve human rights treaties, which the United
States invariably ratifies subject to a statement that the domestic courts shall not enforce
the obligations contained therein. For a debate on whether the treaties permit this
limitation, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 152, with Ryan Goodman, Human
Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 536
(2002).
158. Vsquez, supra note 152, at 713-15.
159. See discussion supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text; see also
GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 8, at 48-52.
160. 337 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
161. Convention on Double Taxation, Taxes on Income and on Capital, Sept.
26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art. XXIV(4)(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,087, at 22.
162. 26 U.S.C. § 59(a)(2) (2000).
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but neither protocol addressed Article
after the enactment of § 59(a)(2),
63
1
treaty.
original
the
of
XXIV
A court might unravel this conflict by adopting one of four possible
defaults: (1) a domestic court could enforce rights under an international
agreement unless domestic legislation explicitly repudiates the
agreement;
(2) a domestic court could treat the last enactment as
controlling, but would interpret "enactment" generously so as to treat
treaty amendments as ratifications of the entire treaty; (3) as the D.C.
Circuit held in Kappus, a domestic court could treat the last enactment
as binding, and interpret "enactment" as limited to the language in
dispute;165 or (4) a domestic court could never allow a treaty provision to
supersede a statute without express legislative authorization to do so.'66
This progression illustrates a transition from the proactive to the
bargaining approach, as each successive move reflects an incremental
of the judiciary to hold the government to its
reluctance on the part
167
treaty commitment.
In Chubb & Sons, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 6 ' the Second Circuit had
to decide what law governed a dispute over the misdelivery of goods
shipped by international air carrier. The flight originated in South
Korea and ended in the United States, presumptively bringing the
transaction under the Warsaw Convention. A complicating factor,
however, was the existence of several versions of that multilateral
convention, one of which the United States had joined in 1934 and a
later version of which Korea had embraced in 1967. The court had to
as a
decide whether an agreement existed between the two countries
69
result of their acceptance of overlapping but distinct obligations. 1
A proactive approach would invoke a proagreement default on the
theory that judicial enforcement of some obligations is preferable to no
163. See Kappus, 337 F.3d at 1056-60.
164. A variant of this approach would call on courts to interpret legislation so as
not to violate an international agreement. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). For an extreme example of this interpretive move, see
PalestineLiberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1471 (interpreting a statute intended to bar
establishment of a PLO observer mission at the United Nations as limited by an earlier
treaty regarding the UN headquarters); Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2373-75 (1991) (praising the Palestinian Liberation
Organizationdecision as exemplary interpretive strategy).
165. 337 F.3d at 1060.
166. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 7852(d)(1) (specifying relationship between tax treaties
and the Internal Revenue Code and stating that neither shall receive preferential
treatment).
167. On the analogous issue of the efficacy of the Uniform Commercial Code's
generous contract-creation rules, see generally Scott, Article 2, supra note 17.
168. 214 F.3d 301(2d Cir. 2000).
169. The existence of treaty relations determined both the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the federal court that heard the case and the substantive rules for
determining liability and damages. Id. at 307-14.
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enforcement. One could find a template in Section 2-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which allows courts to make a judicially
enforceable contract in cases where offer and acceptance do not
match. 7 ' Alternately, as the Second Circuit did in Chubb, a court might
require something closer to the common law's mirror-image rule to limit
treaty relations to instances where states had assumed identical
obligations. 7' This default implements the idea that parties might
regard the total bargain as motivating performance and correspondingly
consider partial enforcement as an unwanted outcome.
What we find interesting about both cases is the implicit
relationship between judicial coercion and the international agreement.
In both cases, the degree of domestic enforcement of an international
agreement turns on which template the courts will use. Kappus
implicates the level of domestic lawmaking required to free a court of its
responsibility to enforce an international agreement, while Chubb
considers the level of international interaction required for enforceable
obligations to arise. The former involves exit, the latter involves entry,
but both implicate the activity level of an independent and coercive
judiciary.
Focusing only on U.S. practice, we can see that decisions about
when to use domestic courts to enforce international commitments and
when not to is broadly consistent with the rational-reciprocity approach.
The agreements most likely to generate rights and duties that domestic
courts will enforce involve complex, private commercial transactions,
where the benefits from enhancing the credibility of reciprocal promises
seem greatest and difficulties with verification of salient conditions seem
manageable. The agreements that the United States most often has
directed its courts not to implement involve open-ended human-rights
commitments, which, on the one hand, have great moral clarity and, on
the other hand, present vexing verifiability issues due to the nonspecific
nature of the obligations. As Kappus and Chubb illustrate, the courts
also use secondary doctrines that minimize uncertainty about judicial
reinterpretation of the scope of commitments set by the political
branches.

170. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2003). The trial court in Chubb did precisely this,
although it based its decision on an interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Chubb
& Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 1998 WL 647185, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1998).
The United States was not (and is not) a party to the latter instrument, although the State
Department maintains that some portions of it have the force of customary international
law. See Chubb, 214 F.3d at 309-14.
171. The Second Circuit based its decision on both the general desirability of
such a default and its interpretation of Article 40(5) of the Vienna Convention. Chubb,
214 F.3d at 309-14.
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At the same time, U.S. doctrine regarding domestic enforcement of
obligations contained in international agreements is far from settled, and
academic opinion largely favors a greatly expanded role for U.S. courts,
a role that the rational-reciprocity approach suggests might well be
counterproductive. We do not assert that we have developed a powerful
positive theory, at least as applied to U.S. practice. Rather, we argue
that the contract theory approach provides an explanation of at least the
broad outlines of U.S. approaches to domestic enforcement of
international law and may provide a basis for a normative critique of
academic calls to change that practice.
C. Summary
In designing international agreements, parties can choose from an
array of enforcement techniques, including progressively more coercive
measures wielded by independent tribunals. Self enforcement explains
much about these agreements, but it is incorrect to limit analysis to this
mechanism. Moreover, the framers of international agreements must
take into account not only those aspects of enforcement to which they
advert but also the background assumptions about coercive enforcement
that independent institutions, first among them domestic courts, will
employ. By adjusting these assumptions, independent institutions can
alter the enforcement structures that attend international agreements.
This Part has described the enforcement techniques conventionally
applied to international agreements and in particular has noted the
connection between interpretive techniques and enforcement. We have
observed some support in international practice for the claim that
choices about enforcement, and the interpretive strategies that affect
enforcement, reflect the theoretical framework developed in the first
part of this Article. In the next Part, we consider in greater detail the
suggestion made in the Part I that some enforcement techniques work at
cross purposes with others and explore the implications of this
suggestion for optimal enforcement strategy.
III. SELF ENFORCEMENT AND COERCION AS COMPLEMENTS AND
RIVALS IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

International agreements, no less than private contracts, rely on
some mixture of self enforcement and public coercion to promote
compliance. Does the similarity between international agreements and
private contracts run deeper? As we observed in Part I, a substantial
literature explores the complex relationship between self enforcement
and coercion in private contracts. Experimental research suggests that,
across a significant range of transactions, coercion diminishes the value
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generated by the contractual relationship.7 2 Here we consider the
possibility that coercive enforcement of international agreements may
undermine self enforcement, and thus for some set of obligations detract
from optimal enforcement.
A.

Optimal Enforcement Structure in InternationalAgreements

A naive view of international law might regard more enforcement
as always better. Some international law literature seems to rest on a
view that international agreements are a product that has positive returns
in both scale and scope. 7 3 A little reflection will suggest the
implausibility of this claim. International agreements as much as private
contracts involve predictions about future states in the face of
uncertainty. When these predictions prove incorrect, rigid commitments
make the parties worse off. Knowing that this result may occur, parties
rationally should specify the conditions under which the obligations
contained in an agreement should not apply, rather than insist on the
necessity of the commitment in all possible future states.' 74 Absent
complete prescience, states rationally must balance commitment with
172. See discussion supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
173. We do not find bald claims in the literature, but we do note a tendency to
attack any limitations on domestic enforcement that emerge. For influential examples of
this tendency, see generally JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (1996); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82
MICH. L. REv. 1555 (1984); Henkin, U.S. Ratification, supra note 152; Koh, supra note
164; Jules Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071 (1985).
174. Recall that the canonical contracting problem is to ensure both efficient ex
ante investment and efficient trade. To do so, parties must balance the benefits from
credible commitments against the benefits of flexibility in adjusting to realized states of
the world. To be sure, one method of ensuring flexibility is renegotiation. If the parties
anticipate that the uncertainties they face at the time of contracting ultimately will be
resolved, then logically they will prefer to renegotiate their initial agreement once the
future is known. From this perspective, the initial agreement is only a means by which
the parties set the entitlements that will be traded ex post. If the parties are
symmetrically informed, then bargaining theory teaches us that they will renegotiate to
the efficient result. For example, the parties could agree to a fixed-price contract that
paid the promisor to invest efficiently or conditioned the price on the realized value of
the investment. In such a world, neither party can exploit the specific investments of the
other strategically. The problem, however, is that if information is asymmetric (that is,
costs and valuations are not observable), then either party can exploit the sunk-cost
investment of the other. Under these conditions, to ensure both efficient investment and
efficient trade, parties must be able to precommit not to renegotiate. See Schwartz &
Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 17, at 611-14. In either state of the world, the
parties will renegotiate (or not) against the background of the enforcement mechanisms
that they design. Only if the relevant values are observable but not verifiable will they
have reason to select between self enforcement and coercive enforcement based upon the
prospect of renegotiation.
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flexibility by limiting both the scope of their commitments and the extent
of the sanctions that a violation will trigger.
To be sure, conditions sometime exist where network effects argue
for expanding the scope and the scale of international agreements. An
important example involves the conventions, customs, and practices that
underlie the assignment of Internet domain names. 17 5 But most subjects
of international agreements do not have this quality, and significant
ranges of agreements entail diminishing marginal returns accompanied
by increasing marginal enforcement costs. Optimizing the value of such
agreements involves finding the point where the benefits of any increase
in the scale or scope of the agreement equals the cost associated with the
increase.
This straightforward analysis can be extended to enforcement.
Rather than specifying that an obligation will cease to exist if certain
circumstances arise, instead an agreement may present the parties with a
series of options. For any specified future state, a party may choose
between compliance and undergoing some sanction. An optimal level of
enforcement requires setting the sanction so that the marginal costs of
imposing the sanction equal the marginal benefits from compliance.
And the determination of a sanction in turn implicates the choice of
enforcement mechanism and in particular the mix of self enforcement
and third-party coercion.
B.

Complementarity, Rivalry, and States

In Part I, we reviewed evidence indicating that coercive sanctions
might function as a rival to self enforcement. As we noted, the
experimental data and the conjectures about their significance relate to
individual behavior. We again must ask whether political elites exhibit
similar tendencies. Does the ex ante announcement of the prospect of
coercive sanctions undermine self enforcement of agreements to which
states are parties?
Some similarities seem clear. We expect political elites to care
about reputation generally and, in particular, about being known as
submissive. Indeed, we expect foreign-relations decision-makers to be
more averse to this perception than average individuals, both because of
qualities reinforced by the process of elite selection and because
175. We note that even here, the international community has not created a
monolithic legal system. An independent tribunal, working with the consent of the
administrators of the Internet, has the authority to resolve disputes over the ownership of
domain names, but national authorities have no obligation to respect the determinations
of these tribunals. The speed and low cost of the international process, in contrast to
domestic litigation, ensures that conflicts seldom arise. When they do, however,
domestic courts are free to disregard the tribunal's decision. See, e.g., Barcelona.com,
Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 619 (4th Cir. 2003).
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reputational effects would involve domestic as well as international
capabilities.
Membership in a governing group, we surmise, entails surviving a
selective process in which perceptions of weakness are not rewarded.
Even where advancement depends on convincing superiors of servility,
the supplicant still must present a credible image of mastery of his
inferiors. Therefore, we would expect that people who survive the
process and become decision-makers generally would be willing to incur
substantial costs to punish those who treat them unfairly.
Moreover, the risks of appearing weak are compounded by their
consequences not just for future international interactions but for place
within the domestic-power hierarchy. We surmise that perceptions of
weakness are generalized rather than particular, in that observers usually
do not distinguish among contexts. Thus, an international-relations
decision-maker plausibly can believe that appearing coerced will not
only encourage future demands by other states but also induce domestic
rivals to challenge his position. It seems paradoxical to expect that a
regime too weak to resist coercion by a third party nonetheless can
reliably compel its population to comply with the third party's
command. In the case of Europe, for example, governments on
occasion have found themselves7 incapable
of squelching civil defiance of
6
the edicts of the Brussels court. 1
We are less sure that institutionalizing coercive sanctions for
international agreements induces free-riding on the part of the elites of
regimes that might otherwise inflict costs on noncompliers. 77 Consider
the UN Security Council's supposed monopoly under the UN Charter
regarding authorization of the use of force to punish charter violations.
The example is not perfect because the Security Council monopoly itself
is only self-enforcing in the sense that no third-party enforcer exists to
punish states that encroach on this monopoly. Yet we can make two
observations: countries use force to punish violators of international law
without Security Council permission, as U.S.-led coalitions did in Serbia
and Iraq; and it is unclear whether decisions not to use force in the face
of clear charter violations reflect free-riding or a belief that doing so
without Security Council approval entails additional costs.
Some ambiguous evidence of free-riding comes from the field of
investor protection.
Before the advent of third-party arbitration,
disputes over injuries to foreign investors typically involved state-to176. See, e.g., Case 68/880, Commission v. Greece, 1989 E.C.R. 2965, 2969
(describing the complicity of domestic officials in a scheme to evade EC customs); Case
C-265/95, Commission v. France, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6959, 1-6967 (describing the inability
of the French government to manage civil strife designed to obstruct free movement of
agricultural products required under EC law).
177. See discussion supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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state intervention. In extreme cases, a great power would threaten to use
military force to focus the attention of the injuring state on the investors'
complaint. The rise of the arbitration mechanism over the last forty
years coincides with the end of gunboat diplomacy and, more generally,
in a reduction of efforts by states to expend resources unilaterally on
behalf of injured investors.
We do not want to make too much of this example, because of two
confounding factors. First, over the same forty-year period, the IMF
and the World Bank have acquired increased influence over the policies
of many states and have used threats to withhold financing as an
incentive to induce a reduction of attacks on foreign investors. To some
extent, these institutions have become enforcement agents for the
capital-exporting world.
Second, the arbitration mechanism rests on treaties that create
formally symmetrical obligations. Because arbiters operate free of state
control, to a certain extent they can redefine the scope of protection
provided by these treaties. The capital exporters thus have lost the
ability to fix the scope of their obligations and have found themselves
faced with claims that their own actions violate these treaties. "' Now
that their arguments can be used against them, they may have become
more cautious about supporting claims for protection. We thus concede
that the evidence that coercive enforcement of international agreements
creates a free-riding problem is mixed at best.
Both general arguments and some anecdotal evidence suggests that
introducing coercive commitments to international agreements makes
some states less willing to honor the agreements or to interpret their
obligations liberally. With states, as with individuals, coercion can
undermine the desire to cooperate rather than reinforce it.
Other states may prefer coercion because they regard international
agreements as a precommitment strategy. These countries seek to lock
in currently tolerated policies against shifting future domestic
majorities.' 79 The argument assumes that the effects of an agreement
can be controversial and potentially unpopular, but will not generate
such strong opposition as to lead a country to withdraw from the
coercive system. The critical premise is that regimes do not trust their
future selves to honor commitments, and that others should not trust
them either.
Reciprocal fairness, however, depends fundamentally on trust in the
propensity of counterparties to behave similarly. Signals that this trust
is unwarranted should compel states to alter their premises and in
178. See Stephan, Redistributive Litigation, supra note 135, at 830-39.
179. See Goodman, supra note 157, at 540-45 (discussing "lock-in" goals in
treaties (internal quotations omitted)); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights
Regimes: Democratic Delegation in PostwarEurope, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 220 (2000).
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particular should induce precautions against defection.
These
precautions in turn further indicate lack of trust. To the extent that
explicit commitments to coercive enforcement rest on doubts about
future capacity to comply, they also convey information that undermines
self enforcement.
U.S. practice provides direct evidence of the tension between
coercion and cooperation in the context of international agreements.
One instance involves the UN Charter. After the founding of the United
Nations and its issuance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
civil rights groups in the United States began invoking these instruments
as a ground for attacking the government's role in enforcing racial
segregation.'
A litigation strategy emerged in which opponents of
restrictive laws invoked these international commitments to attack the
status quo. A few progressive state courts embraced the argument,
which rested on the premise that they had the authority to interpret and
enforce the charter, particularly with regard to discrimination.' 8'
Greater use by courts of international agreements to dismantle American
segregation seemed likely.
The United States responded to this pressure by seeking to
eliminate the coercive force of its international commitments. During
the early 1950s, Senator John Bricker introduced versions of a
constitutional amendment that would have barred treaties from having
any effect on domestic law absent implementing legislation. The effort
won the endorsement of the American Bar Association and at one point
came within a single vote of clearing the Senate. The Eisenhower
Administration eventually fended off the movement to codify the
nonenforceability of U.S. international commitments by representing
that it would not enter into any international agreement that had
domestic law reform as its purpose.I
The practice of conditioning
U.S. adherence to agreements regarding domestic civil rights on the
enactment of further domestic legislation has remained the norm since
183
that time.
Critics of this episode in U.S. history emphasize its links to the
defense of segregation, suggesting that only bigotry explains the
180.

See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43-64 (2000).

181. See Sei Fujii v. State, 218 P.2d 595, 596 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950),
vacated, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952); Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (Or.
1949).
182. See The Making of Treaties and the Conduct of Foreign Affairs, DEP'T ST.
BuLL., May 16, 1955, at 820, 822 (statement of Secretary of State Dulles that the
United States would not join multilateral treaties pertaining to human rights); Curtis A.
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98,
122-23 (2000); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 152, at 413.
183. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 152, at 410-23.
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This
opposition to coercive invocation of international law.'
connection is part of the story but fails to do justice to the complex
dynamic surrounding the use of international law in the battle against
U.S. racial segregation. First, the controversy survived Brown v. Board
of Education's definitive attack on segregation: Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles gave the final assurances that ended the push for
constitutional action a year after Brown came down, and some version
of the proposal remained under consideration in the Senate until 1957.185
Second, and more importantly, the range of support for the Bricker
Amendments far exceeded that for segregation. Some important part of
the U.S. legal establishment separated the issues by supporting both the
ending of segregation and some quarantine of international law from the
U.S. legal system.
In hindsight, it appears that most progress on dismantling the legal
basis of segregation, which at some level of abstraction could be
described as a cooperative effort to comply with the obligations of the
charter, took place after Dulles reassured Congress that the Eisenhower
Administration would not use international law to pursue domestic
reform. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, the sending of federal troops to
Little Rock, the Kennedy Administration's mobilization of the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department, and the civil rights legislation
of the mid-1960s all unfolded against a backdrop of no coercive
international obligation. The domestic courts acquired an enlarged
arsenal to use against racial discrimination, but none involved the UN
Charter or any other international agreement.
A similar, lower-profile episode involves the GATT. President
Harry S. Truman signed this agreement in 1947, relying on the authority
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 86 Neither the 1934
Act nor the 1947 agreement expressly addressed the issue of
implementing legislation, but a handful of courts and slightly more
commentators argued that a rule of direct effect should apply.' s

184.

Henkin, U.S. Ratification, supra note 152, at 348-49.

DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF
185.
EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 191-214 (1988). In the view of contemporaries,
the Supreme Court decision that undermined the Bricker Amendment supporters was not
Brown, but Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which assuaged fears that a Senateapproved treaty might indirectly amend the Constitution. Id. at 213.

186. See George Bronz, An International Trade Organization: The Second
Attempt, 69 HARV. L. REV. 440, 443 (1956).
187. See Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798,
Ct. App. 1962); Territory of Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565, 567 (1957); Robert
The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the United States, in THE
COMMUNITY AND GATT 187, 197-99 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986);
Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 481 (1990); John H. Jackson, The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L.
809 (Dist.
E. Hudec,
EUROPEAN
Ronald A.
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Congress responded by inserting in each new trade bill language to the
effect that it should not be seen as either endorsing or rejecting the
proposition that the GATT had a direct effect in U.S. law. 8 ' During the
time that this remained an open question, the GATT process focused
mostly on tariff reduction and the elimination of transparently
discriminatory barriers to imports. The issue of direct effect of the
GAIT for the most part remained an academic question of little
practical effect.
Beginning with the Tokyo Round Agreements of 1979, however,
the GATT regime began to extend to more subjects and to threaten a
greater range of domestic policies. The Tokyo Agreements represented
a turn towards combating disguised discrimination, which typically
involves the appropriation of a valid regulatory objective as a more or
less pretextual basis for barring imports. Efforts to discourage this
practice present a greater risk of interfering with legitimate public
policies. In response, some of the more problematic commitments
contained express language barring coercive enforcement. 89
The further broadening of the scope of international economic
agreements induced even greater commitments against coercive domestic
enforcement. In 1993, NAFTA, which took shape during the Uruguay
Round and in significant respects reflected it, provided the first occasion
for Congress to state explicitly that the domestic courts could not engage
The following year,
in independent enforcement of NAFrA.' 9
Congress applied exactly the same conditions to the Uruguay Round
Agreements, which superseded as well as extended the GATT. 9 '
Neither the human rights nor the GATT case study proves that the
United States displayed a more cooperative attitude toward potential
partners in multilateral agreements when it was free of the threat of
REV. 250, 260 (1967). See generally Note, The United States Participation in the
GeneralAgreementon Tariffs and Trade, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 505 (1961).
188. See Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, § 10, 65 Stat. 72,
75 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1366); Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953, ch. 348,
§ 103, 67 Stat. 472, 472; Act of July 1, 1954, ch. 445, § 3, 68 Stat. 360, 360; Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, § 3(a)(1)(A), 69 Stat. 162, 163 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 135 1(a)(1)(A)); Act of Aug. 20, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, § 10, 72 Stat.
673, 680.

189.

See, e.g., Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 916 F.2d 903,

908 (3rd Cir. 1990) (discussing the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
93 Stat. 144).
190. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, § 102, 107 Stat. 2057, 2062 (1998) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 3312). The act
does carve out a small role for judicial enforcement of the agreement, but only in cases
where the U.S. government, and not private parties or other governmental bodies, seeks
to enforce the agreement against itself or state or local governments. 29 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)(2), (c)(2).
191. Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102,
108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512).
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coercive enforcement by independent domestic courts. We recognize
that other factors might explain both the periods of cooperation and the
earlier conservatism about international commitments. We still find it
interesting that, in these two disparate areas and at two different times,
U.S. efforts to exhibit cooperative compliance with its international
obligations coincided with strong measures to discourage coercive
enforcement.
C.

Creeping Coercion

To this point, our analysis has assumed that coercive enforcement
attached to an international agreement operates in an ex ante fashion on
the basis of deliberate choices by the framers of the agreement. But, as

U.S. experience with the UN Charter and the GATT illustrates, the
prospect of coercive enforcement can arise after the fact or function as
an uncertain background risk at the time of entering into an agreement.
In the case of arbitration commitments, the scope of the obligation may
be indeterminate, both as to what constitutes a protected investment and
as to what constitutes an compensable encroachment. 1 2 Both the
economic obligations embedded in the EU and the human rights
commitments embedded in the Council of Europe have changed in
surprising ways over time as a result of judicial creativity.' 93 And the
192. Consider some of the issues that have led to NAFTA-based Chapter 11
arbitration: The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Award, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
at
69-70
(Jun.
26,
2003),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf (finding egregious misconduct
in civil trial leading to enormous damages manifestly a denial of justice subject to
Chapter 11; and that no relief was available because victim failed to seek appellate
review); S.D Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.caltna/nac/documents/myersvcanadapartialaward final 1311 00.pdf (determining that a government order banning export of PCBs from Canada
for waste processing in United States violates obligations under Chapter 11); Metalclad
Corp. v. United Mexican States, Final Award (Sept. 2, 2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/a/c3752.htm (finding that a denial of permit for hazardous waste
landfill violates obligations under Chapter 11); and Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on
Jurisdiction (Jun. 24, 1998), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tranac/documents/ethyl6.pdf (finding that a statute banning a fuel additive destroyed the
business and raised the issue of a Chapter 11 violation). For fuller discussion, see
generally Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment
Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (2003).
193. See generally Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141 (European
Court of Justice has final authority to review application of the Treaty of Rome by a
domestic court); Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Berlastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 3 (Treaty of Rome provisions create rights that individuals
can directly enforce in domestic courts); E. v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539
(2003) (determining that the failure by social services to exercise due diligence in
supervising children endangered by their home environment violates the European
Convention); I. v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 967 (2002) (finding that failing
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process of internalization of international rules by domestic courts,
based as it is on highly flexible doctrine and nonspecific criteria,
undermines predictability.'94
Because foreknowledge of coercive enforcement can interfere with
self enforcement of an agreement, it follows that substantial uncertainty
can reduce investments in self enforcement. First, we assume that
asymmetrical uncertainty is unlikely. Those characteristics of thirdparty enforcers that affect the likelihood of their future actions normally
are public knowledge, or at least are known to specialists whose services
are available symmetrically. Parties ought to know that doubts about
coercion will affect the behavior of their counterparties as well as their
own. Both their own preferences for reciprocity and expectations about
those of their counterparties should be shaped by the knowledge that at
some future date an obligation may become subject to third-party
enforcement.
Second, the logic of the arguments for the rivalrous relationship of
self enforcement and coercive enforcement of international agreements
extends to the case where coercion is possible rather than certain. The
reputational effect of compliance will reflect doubts about whether the
behavior will be seen as cooperative or submissive. The possibility of
coercive enforcement, and not just its certainty, should affect decisions
whether to free-ride rather than absorb the costs involved in sanctioning
noncompliers. Finally, uncertainty about whether compliant behavior
reflects a preference for cooperation or a fear of coercion will reduce
the desire of other parties to reciprocate.
The two episodes discussed above-the United States's resistance to
judicial enforcement of the UN Charter and to direct application of the
GATT by the courts-both involved uncertainty over third-party
coercion, not a reaction to a clear decision to provide coercive
enforcement. In both cases, a few progressive state courts had endorsed
direct enforcement, but no federal court had done so and nothing like a
consensus for that result existed. The Dulles reassurances of 1955 and
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 represented steps to
foreclose possibilities, rather than decisions to reverse any particular
outcome.

to give legal recognition to sex change violates the right to privacy); Pretty v. United
Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2002) (discussing a right to assisted suicide); Jordan v.
United Kingdom, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (2001) (determining that deficiencies in police
investigation of homicide constitute a violation of the European Convention's right to
life); Guerra v. Italy, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357 (1998) (serious environmental pollution
violates the right to privacy); Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1994)
(solid waste treatment plant located near home violates the right to privacy).
194. Visquez, supra note 152, at 695 (subject is the "most confounding" in
United States law (citations omitted, internal quotations omitted)).
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We emphasize this point because most instances of coercive
enforcement of international agreements involve uncertainty rather than
clear decisions incorporated into the agreement. Unless framers make
an explicit commitment against coercion, they face a positive, and
perhaps substantial, risk that third parties at some future date will take it
upon themselves to compel compliance. To the extent third-party
enforcement impedes self enforcement, this risk lowers the value of
international agreements. The logical next question, then, is what
metarules parties to international agreements might apply to minimize
the risk of unwanted future assertions of third-party enforceability.
D. The Limits of Coercion
To recapitulate our argument, self enforcement plays an important,
and perhaps underappreciated, role in the enforcement of international
agreements. This role, however, is not limitless. Coercive sanctions
imposed by third parties can increase the value of commitments
contained in agreements, if (1) the commitments rest on verifiable
information; and (2) repeat play, reputation, and a preference for
reciprocal fairness are, for any number of reasons, ineffectual under the
circumstances. The challenge is to define with sufficient clarity the
conditions for the application of third-party coercion to avoid
compromising the value that self enforcement can generate. And
because third-party coercion sometimes can be desirable and sometimes
is not, the clearest metarules-an all-or-nothing approach of an absolute
ban on third-party enforcement or a rule of automatic third-party
enforcement-will not work.
An obvious complication is that complete elimination of uncertainty
about the availability of third-party coercion would be unrealistic.
Neither international agreements themselves, nor any hypothetical
metarules for interpreting and applying those agreements, can anticipate
all future states and specify for each whether third-party or self
enforcement will apply.
Instead, decision-makers confront the
unavoidable trade-off between accuracy and clarity; the former approach
implemented by open-ended rules that delegate to the third party
considerable discretion as to whether to apply coercive sanctions, and
the latter by bright-line rules that may produce both Type I and Type II
errors.' 9 The choice of any particular metarule necessarily involves
accepting one or the other of these costs.
Consider as a limiting case a formalistic approach that incorporates
four distinct but interrelated interpretive defaults: (1) the third party,
195. For fuller discussion of the accuracy-precision trade-off, see Isaac Ehrlich
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemadng, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 258-59 (1974).
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such as a domestic court, applies the same interpretive strategy to all
international agreements, regardless of subject or object; (2) the third
party requires an explicit reference to coercive third-party enforcement
as a condition of enforceability; (3) the third party divines obligations
within an agreement only where clearly stated; and (4) the third party
will allow only those persons clearly embraced by the agreement to
invoke its provisions. Applying this approach, a court would intervene
to enforce the agreement only if the agreement invoked this mode of
enforcement,1 96 only if the agreement clearly created an obligation
relevant to the dispute before the third party, 97 and only if the
agreement applied to the person seeking to enforce it.' 9t In making
these decisions, the court would not consider the subject or object of the
agreement, and in particular would not distinguish between agreements
intended to benefit or protect particular classes of individuals.'"
Together these defaults implement a consistent strategy in the sense
that they are necessary for a comprehensively restrictive approach to
third-party coercion. As a matter of logic, however, a third-party
enforcer could depart from one or more of them. The question is why.
One might justify a different default for substantive reasons unconnected
to contract theory or because of strategies suggested by contract-based
arguments for optimal defaults.
First, consider conventional arguments that disregard contract
theory. Among specialists in international law, it has become popular to
distinguish between traditional international-law obligations and the new
body of human-rights law that has emerged in the years since World
War II. An early decision of the International Court, for example,
noted that the postwar multilateral human-rights treaties do not aspire to
"individual

advantages

or

disadvantages

to

States,

or ... the

maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and
duties." 200 Because they involve a general humane purpose rather than
bargained exchange, these instruments require distinct and generous
196. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 441-43 (1989) (finding no judicial enforcement of Geneva Convention on the High
Seas or Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention).
197. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187-88
(1993) (interpreting Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as not creating an
obligation to provide a hearing on refugee status before returning detained persons to
state of emigration).
198. See, e.g., Chubb, 214 F.3d at 314 (finding that U.S. obligations under
Warsaw Convention did not apply to Korean parties).
199. See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of
Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48, 61-63 (1949)
(discussing general presumption in international law of restrictive interpretation of
international agreements so as to minimize derogations of national sovereignty).
200. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23.

626

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

interpretive strategies to ensure the fulfillment of their benign
objectives.2"'
It is possible to view arguments of this sort as a variation of the
claim that international law produces economies of scale and scope,
albeit limited to the particular category of human-rights law.20 2 In
essence, it asserts that because human-rights-law obligations are so
fundamentally important, any increase in enforcement resources devoted
to them would produce a positive return. Domestic judicial enforcement
is simply one way of augmenting these resources.
If the premise of this argument is correct, then this argument is
unanswerable. And perhaps human rights rest on such incommensurable
values that no cost-benefit analysis can be applied. Scholarly debate
then would have to move to second-order issues, such as whether the
power to determine which values demand super-enforcement should rest
with judges or instead with more politically accountable actors.
The best we can do is express skepticism that rationalist,
instrumentalist analysis is so limited. We suspect that enforcement of
even dignitary values and decency come at some cost. Moreover, if
coercive enforcement crowds out self enforcement, then more
enforcement is not only costly but also reduces the effective level of
compliance with the agreement. 0 3 Enforcement thus can become
counterproductive on two separate dimensions. Perhaps the episode
involving international law and the civil rights revolution supports this
point, although we understand that this inference is controversial. In
any case, rational reciprocity presents a challenge to those who would
not recognize any limits on the enforcement of this class of rights.
Next, consider what contract theory might suggest about optimal
defaults. On the one hand, scholars argue that a default should
represent the contract term that parties would prefer regarding the issue
in question-what conventionally is called a majoritarian default. °4 A
complementary approach asks whether a default can correct information
asymmetries between the parties by inducing the disclosure of
information that would augment the joint value of the parties bargain201.
See, e.g., Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of InternationalAgreements by
Domestic Courts and the Politics of InternationalTreaty Relations: Reflections on Some
Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
559, 632-42 (1996) (linking the argument for new interpretive approaches to changing
nature of international community and corresponding obligations); Koh, supra note 164,
at 2398-2402 (arguing for new interpretative strategies to take account of a "new
international legal process").
202. See discussion supra note 175 and accompanying text.
203. See discussion supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971, 1024
(1983).
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what is called an information-forcing or penalty default."0 5 Consistent
with this analysis, we should speculate as to whether parties to
international agreements generally prefer coercive third-party
enforcement or not, and whether any information-forcing argument
exists for choosing an alternative enforcement regime.2 6
We have not done the empirical work that might provide confident
answers to these questions. Instead, we will focus on a single issue that
relates to the optimal-default literature. All things being equal, do
parties to an international agreement typically wish to start from a
premise of reciprocal fairness, or from a premise of chiseling and
noncompliance? Should defaults, in other words, put the onus on parties
who distrust one another to articulate their suspicions, or should defaults
force bargaining states to make a case for pure self enforcement without
external coercion?
The experimental evidence discussed in Part I of this Article
suggests a response to this question. Introducing the subject of failure
and opportunism tends to have an unhappy effect on the resulting
agreement. People who know that they may be punished perform less
well than people who know that they may be rewarded. Forcing states
to rebut the premise that they will defect may trigger the same dynamic.
Beginning with a default of no coercive third-party enforcement and then
requiring the bargaining states to stipulate deviations from this rule
allows negotiations to proceed without undermining a premise of
reciprocal fairness.
Moreover, if the prospect of coercive enforcement makes some
international bargains unattainable, then uncertainty about that prospect
also should impose a burden on valuable transactions into which states

205. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91-92 (1989).
Information forcing defaults are also designed to mimic majoritarian preferences because
parties can always create such rules on their own.

Thus, the default is, in effect,

replicating what a party would want ex ante when it creates incentives for a party to
disclose information to its contracting partner. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the
Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 85-86 (2003).

206. We recognize that we are eliding a number of difficult questions raised in
the contracts literature, including whether to determine a majoritarian default by the
number of preferences or the intensity of preference, and how to address offsetting
asymmetries in information. For further discussion of these problems, see generally
Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV.

1547 (1999); Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan, Richardson v. McKnight and the
Scope of Immunity After Privatization, 8 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 103, 130-32 (2000);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985);
Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
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might enter. Defaults that reduced this uncertainty at a reasonable cost
thus would be optimal.
(184) This analysis does not require U.S. courts to rethink their
approach to the enforcement of international agreements.
The
articulated doctrine may be unsatisfactory, but the general pattern of
U.S. practice conforms to a set of defaults that restricts domestic
enforcement to those instances where the international agreement calls
for it in express terms. Our immediate tentative observation is simply
that international practice generally, and U.S. practice in particular,
suggest that an optimal default of no coercive enforcement already
operates.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Article represents an initial attempt to develop a general
theory of the enforceability of international agreements. We focus
attention on the experimental evidence of a general, though not
universal, preference for reciprocal fairness and the possibility that
reciprocity-based enforcement mechanisms can be crowded out by
coercive enforcement. Both the evidence for these phenomena in
individuals and the extension of the experimental hypotheses to
international behavior remains preliminary and tentative.
We
nevertheless find the implications of these hypotheses sufficiently
important to justify our analysis. But more work remains to be done.
First, we need a theory that can better explain the relationship
between individual preferences and the behavior of states. International
relations theory makes a first step in this direction with its distinction
between regimes and national interest. But how might a preference for
reciprocal fairness manifest itself in regime preferences? Under what
circumstances would a regime expose itself to the risk of external
coercion? How do preferences vary among types of regimes, and what
explains these variations? We have made a start at answering these
questions, knowing that further analysis lies ahead.
Second, more empirical work is needed. States obviously are not
amenable to the kinds of laboratory experiments that we have described,
but other techniques exist to test hypotheses about state behavior. We
have offered here a typology of enforcement mechanisms in
international agreements and made some anecdotal observations, but we
do not pretend to have made a systematic study of the field. That work
also lies before us. We are confident, however, that our speculations
point in the right direction and suggest a research agenda for the field.
However tentative our conclusions may be about the nature of self
enforcement and its relation to coercive enforcement, we wish to stake
out a strong methodological claim. Contract theory offers rich and
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important insights for the field of international law. It has made robust
contributions to our understanding of private behavior, and we believe
its extension to international bargaining and agreements is overdue. A
focus on rational behavior under conditions of limited information,
which is so important in enabling us to explain and evaluate private
contracting, also can enrich our understanding of international relations
and international law. Whether rational reciprocity ultimately carries
the day in providing a robust account of international relations and
lawmaking, as we hope it will, we are convinced that future work in
international law will owe a substantial intellectual debt to contract
theory and scholarship.

